An analysis of tank gap in military balance between Republic of Korea and North Korea. by Kim, Dong Hui
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1989
An analysis of tank gap in military balance between
Republic of Korea and North Korea.
Kim, Dong Hui.











AN ANALYSIS OF TANK GAP IN MILITARY BAL-






Thesis Advisor Richard A. McGonigal




security classification of this page
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
la Report Security Classification Unclassified lb Restrictive Markings
2a Security Classification Authority
2b Declassification Downgrading Schedule
3 Distribution Availability of Report
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
4. Performing Organization Report Number(s) 5 Monitoring Organization Report Number(s)




7a Name of Monitoring Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
6c Address (city, siare, and ZIP code)
Monterev. CA 93943-5000
7b Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterev, CA 93943-5000
8a Name of Funding Sponsoring Organization 8b Office Symbol
(if applicable)
9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number
8c Address (city-, state, and ZIP code) 10 Source of Funding Numbers
Program Element No Proiect No Task No Work Unit Accession No
n Title (include security classification) AN ANALYSIS OF TANK GAP IN MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN REPUBLIC
OF KORFA AND NORTH KOREA.
12 Personal Author(s) Kirn. Don2 Ilui








16 Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are, those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or po-
sition of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
7 Cosati Codes
Field Groun Subgroup
IS Subject Terms (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
military balance, tank, dynamic analysis
19 Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) At present, some analysts advocate (both ROK and L'.S.) a
reduction or withdraw of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula and a return of all the rights of command to the ROK
government. This will increase the risk of another war on the Korean Peninsula. If war were to break out, Korea might be
devastated economically, returning the people to the poverty levels of 1953. Also, war on the Korean Peninsula might lead
to, or precipitate, another World War because the powerful allied nations (both U.S. and USSR) would participate in that
war. Therefore, peace on the Korean Peninsula is very important and can be achieved if the ROK and NK perceive each
other as possessing balanced military strength. NK currently has superior military strength. So to maintain peace, if the U.S.
were to withdraw, it would be necessary for the ROK government to increase defense spending. The purpose of this thesis
is to identify the tank gap as a major of military strength and provide some ideas to the ROK goverment for the military
equipment modernizing plan. This thesis provides numerical quantitative assessment of the current balance of tank forces
between the ROK and NK, as well as a dvnamic assessment using the Lanchester combat model.
20 Distribution Availability of Abstract
13 unclassified unlimited D same as report D DTIC users
21 Abstract Security Classification
Unclassified
22a Name of Responsible Individual
Richard A. McGoniaal




}D FORM 1473.84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
security classification of this page
Unclassified
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.




Captain, Republic Of Korea Army
B.A., Korea Third Military Academy, 1986
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





At present, some analysts advocate (both ROK and U.S.) a reduction or withdraw of
U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula and a return of all the rights of command to the
ROK government. This will increase the risk of another war on the Korean Peninsula.
If war were to break out, Korea might be devastated economically, returning the people
to the poverty levels of 1953. Also, war on the Korean Peninsula might lead to, or
precipitate, another World War because the powerful allied nations (both U.S. and
USSR) would participate in that war. Therefore, peace on the Korean Peninsula is very
important and can be achieved if the ROK and NK perceive each other as possessing
balanced military strength. NK currently has superior military strength. So to maintain
peace, if the U.S. were to withdraw, it would be necessary for the ROK government to
increase defense spending. The purpose of this thesis is to identify the tank gap as a
major of military strength and provide some ideas to the ROK goverment for the mili-
tary equipment modernizing plan. This thesis provides numerical quantitative assess-
ment of the current balance of tank forces between the ROK and NK, as well as a
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There is no doubt about the geopolitical importance the Korean Peninsula holds in
Northeast Asia. Located in the center of triangular competition among China, the
Soviet Union and Japan, Korea has held a strategic position, though in varying degrees
at different times. Its control was always a prerequisite for hegemony in Northeast Asia.
[Ref. 1: p. 13]
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North
Korea (NK) have maintained their military forces in a high state of readiness. The
dangers of a war on the Korean Peninsula extend beyond the two Korean states to their
major allies who would undoubtedly become involved in a major Korean conflict. Thus
stability in this strategic area has been a key element in determining policy for the major
powers as well as the two Koreas.
Although there has been relative stability on the Korean Penisula since the end of
the Korean War, the strategic environment has been in a continual state of change.
Until recently the strategic environment was largely determined by the quantity and
quality of arms supplied to NK and ROK by major allies. However, since the late
1960s, both NK and ROK have pursued policies to develop their own indigenous arms
industries, expanded their defense budgets, and implemented modernization programs
for their militaries. A consequence of these developments has been an increasing mili-
tary competition between NK and ROK and a reduction in the ability of the major
power allies to influence the actions of the Koreans.
This thesis analyzes the tank gap between NK and ROK as measured by its military
strength and proposed a framework for the ROK armored structure plan.
A. BACKGROUND
In August 1943, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill proclaimed the Atlantic Charter, giving hope to people, like the
Koreans, who had been forcibly deprived of their sovereignty. [Ref. 1: p. 13]
The spirit of the Atlantic Charter was given a more concrete shape in the Cairo
Declaration adopted in November 1943 at a meeting of President Roosevelt, Prime
Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China, held
to discuss problems which might arise after the war. Concerning the future of Korea,
the declaration stated: "... mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people, the afore-
said Three Powers are resolved that Korea shall become free and independent in due
course." [Ref. 1: p. 14] Through the declaration, the Allied Powers promised democratic
and unified independence to the Korean people after a certain transitional period. The
Cairo Declaration was reconfirmed by the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945, and the
Soviet Union subscribed to the declaration when it declared war on Japan in August
1945.
In the meantime President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier
Joseph Stalin met in Yalta in February 1945 to discuss matters concerning Soviet par-
ticipation in the war against Japan and treatment of post-war questions. In return for
joining in the war against Japan, with which it was bound by a treaty of nonaggression,
the Soviet Union was promised at the Yalta Conference that it would regain its former
territory and various other concessions in the Far East. [Ref. 1: p. 14]
On August 15, 1945, Japanese Emperor Hirohito surrendered unconditionally to the
Allied Powers. When Japan notified the Allied Powers of its intention to surrender un-
conditionally, the U.S. Government decided, mainly for military considerations, that
Soviet troops would accept the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea in areas north of
the 3Sth parallel while the American troops would do the same south of the parallel.
The decision became concrete in Geneal Order No. 1 issued by General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the Pacific, on September 2
that year (effective five days later). [Ref. 1: p. 14]
The foreign ministers of the three powers- the United States, Great Britain, and the
Soviet Union- held a conference in Moscow on December 16, 1945; Ministers Byrnes,
Bevin. and Molotov reached an agreement on December 26 concerning the establish-
ment of a unified provisional Korean government. The Republic of China later took
part in the meeting known as the Moscow Conference of the Four Ministers. [Ref. 1:
p. 16]
Regardless of Allied Nations effort to establish a unified provisional Korean gov-
ernment, ROK and NK established their own government. ROK's elections were held
on May 10 1948. On August 15 194S, the government of ROK was inaugurated with
Syngman Rhee as its first president. NK held it's own elections on September 9 1948,
and established its government.
The North Korean government has maintained that two essential elements for suc-
cessful reunification are: (1) the withdrawal of all American forces from ROK and the
end of American involvement, and (2) the overthrow of the Republic Of Korean gov-
ernment and the establishment of a patriotic democratic left-leaning government that
would agree to reunification on North Korea's terms. Based on these elements military
competition has increased on the Korean Peninsula. [Ref. 2: p. 253]
Both ROK and NK are preparing for a major war at an increasing pace. Production
and buying significantly more weapons for ever-increasing the readiness of their forces,
the Korean peninsula is already one of the world's most militarized areas.
The high level of tension between North and South Korea in recent years, due to
incidents such as the Rangoon bombing and the downing of the KAL jetliner has once
again focused attention on the military situation on the Korean peninsula. These ten-
sions, coupled with the deteriorating health of Kim II Sung, who vowed to unify the
Koreas before his death, and the increasing economic disparity between the North and
South have led many to conclude that the chances of war are greater now than at any
time since 1953.
Based upon existing force sturctures ROK has been unable to delay a NK tank at-
tack in the Korean War likewise NK has been unable to defend themselves from an air
attack by ROK in U.S. aircraft. Therfore NK built almost of all their military facilities
underground. On the other hand, The ROK government has constucted many tank
obstacles to protect themselves against a NK tank attack and delay their speed. Addi-
tionally the ROK wants, to increase its number of tanks to be on the par with NK cur-
rently. There is a large disparity between the number of tanks between the ROK and
NK.
This thesis examines the extent of a tank gap between the two Koreas and identifies
factors that influence conventional balance of tank power in war time.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES
Along the Demilitarized Zone today, the North Koreans have eight corps in their
forward area, including four armored corps. One of these corps is a recently re-
organized force of three armored divisions composed of medium tanks and supporting
mechanized fighting vehicles. NK appears to be rebuilding the armored forces to the
levels that existed when NK devastatingly invaded ROK in the early summer of 1950.
[Ref. 3: p. 56]
At present, some analysts advocate (both ROK and U.S.) a reduction or withdraw
of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula and a return of all the rights of command to
the ROK government. This will increase the risk of another war on the Korean Penin-
sula. If war were to break out Korea could be devastated economically, returning the
people to the poverty levels of 1953. Also, war on the Korean Peninsula could cause
another World War because the powerful allied nations (both U.S. and USSR) will
undoubtly participate in that war. Therefore, peace on the Korean Peninsula is very
important and can be achieved' both ROK and NK have balanced military strength.
NK currently has superior military strength, so to maintain peace, it is necessary for the
ROK government to increase defense spending.
The objectives of this thesis are:
• To compare the tank strength of NK and the ROK as a part of the measure of
military strength.
• Evaluate and recommend the tank strength needed by the ROK to establish a bal-
ance of power with NK assuming U.S. troops withdrawl from the Korean Penin-
sula.
• Identify the importance of the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula in preventing
war.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The comparison of the ROK and NK is made in terms of their military strength,
especially tank power. Anti-tank weapon are not considered in this thesis because both
side's anti-tank numbers are similar with very little power differential. Armored vehicles
are also not considered. Comparison between each side is made according to recently
declassified data from military reports.
This thesis assumes that each side's tank capabilities are equal to that of major allied
nations; thus ROK's tank power is equal to the U.S.'s tank and NK's is equal to the
USSR's. It is also assumed that each side's tanks function normally in time of war.
D. METHODOLOGY
The basic form of this study is descriptive. This methodogy involves the collection
and evaluation of facts related to the topic. Two comparative methods are used to de-
termine the tank gap between ROK and NK. The first is a numerical comparison
method and the second is a dynamic analysis.
The numerical comparison analyzes existing data, from two view points. One view
is with U.S. support and the other is without U.S. support. The Static method considers
only the total of tank forces available to each side at a given time and it does not ac-
count for the progress of fighting or combat losses on either side.
A Dynamic assessments is an appropriate methodology since warfare is a dynamic
process. The Dynamic method, which attempts to model the progress of a battle and
reflect combat losses, is discussed more fully in chapter IV.
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I states the background, objective,
scope, limitations, assumptions, and methodology.
Chapter II is an overview of military competition between ROK and NK. In
chapter II military development before the Korean war is discussed. Then military
competition is evaluated. In competition arms transfers to Korea, arms industry, mili-
tary expenditures and total military situation on the Korean peninsula are evaluated.
Chapter III examines the numerical and static tank gap between ROK and XK.
The organization of armored forces are evaluated and the limitations of the numerical
comparison and static comparison method are discussed.
Chapter IV presents the dynamic model. In chapter IV Lanchester's equations are
introduced as a dynamic model for applying on the Korean peninsula. Lanchester's
Square Law and Linear Law are introduced and discussed in measuring the tank gap
between ROK and NK in dynamic situation. The limitations of the Lanchester model
on the Korean Peninsula are addressed.
Chapter V make a conclusion based on the proceeding research. The thesis is con-
eluded by determining of there is a reasonable gap in tank power between ROK and XK.
It will also address the significance of U.S. forces lacated on the Korean Peninsula as
protection should another war occur.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF MILITARY COMPETITION BETWEEN ROK
AND NK
NK and the ROK have two of the most militarized societies in the world by any
measurement, be it per capita military spending, military spending as percent of gov-
ernment spending and gross national product, or incorporation of the "civilian" popu-
lation into the military structure.
This chapter introduces the military development before the Korean war in 1950 and
the military competition to the present. The arms transfers and arms industry of both
NK and ROK are evaluated and show the total military strength of today. This will help
in understanding the situation before comparing the tank gap between the two Korea.
A. MILITARY DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE KOREAN WAR
The quest for military superiority began early between the Koreas. North Korea
had established a full-fledged army, with 200,000 regular soliders, by February 1^48.
Conversely. ROK had about 50.500 soldiers when it was inaugurated in August 1948.
[Rcf. 4: p. 179]
NORTH KOREA
One of the first acts of the newly-formed North Korean Government was to create
a large standing army. Under Soviet guidance, conscription was introduced, military
training schools established, and training of cadets and officers begun. The first units
were activated in February 1946. By 1947, force levels rose to 150,000, and to 200.000
by 194S. Formal establishment of the Korean People's Army was announced in Febru-
ary 1948—seven months prior to the establishment of the Democratic Republic. [Ref.
5: p. 314]
The Soviet Union was the sole supplier of military equipment to NK between 1945
and 1950. During this time, economic and military aid supplied to the North was esti-
mated to value S56 million dollars. [Ref. 6: p. 41]
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The buildup of forces in NK went almost undetected by the United States which
was preoccupied with the containment of communism in Europe. Thus, when Soviet
and American troops were withdrawn from Korea in 1948, a large military imbalance
existed.
The ROK's military was totally inadequate to defend itself against the North
Korean invasion in 1950. Although South Korean forces had been provided with some
weapons and training, a precaution had been taken by the American Occupation Army
to arm South Korean forces with only light defensive weapons. [Ref. 4: p. 181]
Although part of the blame for South Korea's inadequate defense capability can be
placed on the U.S., most of the blame must go to the ROK president, Rhee. Former
Ambassador John S. Muccio explained the American position:
President Rhee had a very unrealistic attitude toward that whole issue. He thought that
the people of the North were waiting for him to arrive on a white charger, that they would
all get up and acclaim him, and that Korea would be unified, and ...as many incursions took
place north of the 3Sth parallel, as well as south of it, that tied our hands, there was a
danger that aggression would occur from the South. [Ref. 7: p. 16]
Therefore, when the Korean War began in 1950, the ROK's military possessed no tanks,
t
.'no medium nor heavy artillery7
,
and no combat aircraft.
B. ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE KOREAS
Arms transfers to both NK and ROK played a significant role in the development
of their military forces. Until they were able to establish their own indigenous arms in-
dustries, both were totally dependent on arms imports to equip their forces. Therefore,
the study of arms transfer is a good place to study the military development of both
NK and the ROK.
This section will present a chronological study of arms transfers beginning with the
prewar period, 1945-1950, followed by an examination of arms transfers during the
Korean War, 1950-1953. The study will then shift to an examination of arms transfers
by decades.
1. PREWAR, 1945-1950
The prewar time frame is important because of the events that transpired in
arms transfers during this period which influenced the course of the war.
NORTH KOREA
The Soviet Union entirely dominated NK during this period. They were the sole
supplier of arms, ammunition, gasoline, vehicles, and other military items. Soviet aid,
both economic and military, is estimated to have been S56 million between 1945 and
1950. [Ref. 6: p. 241] After the Soviet withdraw their troops in 1949, the North Koreans
were provided with large deliveries of tanks, trucks, artillery, and war planes. Included
in the 242 Soviet tanks furnished under this aid program were the T-34's which were
believed to be the best tank in the world at that time. Also, the 150 war planes supplied
to North Korea included modern 11-10 bombers, and Yap-9P fighter planes. [Ref. 8:
p. 192]
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The U.S. approach to ROK before the outreak of the Korean War could best
be described as ambivalent. Due to the action of the Rhee Government, the U.S. Oc-
cupation Army had equipped ROK only with light arms and mortars, and provided some
technical training, but the U.S. had taken "the precaution to arm the ROK Army only
with light defensive weapons to preclude any temptation to invade NK. [Ref. 8: p. 20]
2. THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
The Korean War began June 25. 1950, when the North Koreans invaded the
South. This shifted the U.S. military assistance program for ROK from limited assist-
ance to direct intervention and massive aid. In turn. NK received comparable aid from
the Soviet Union, as well as direct Chinese intervention.
NORTH KOREA
During the Korean War. military aid to NK consisted mainly of aircraft, tanks,
and artillery. (See Appendix A) Included in the equipment supplied to NK were 200 jet
fighter aircraft, and 450 T-34 tanks.
Although NK received massive Soviet and Chinese support, their armed forces
were decimated by the war. Their Army suffered enourmous casualties and equipment
losses. Similarly, the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Corps had to completely re-
group and retrain due to the enormous losses suffered in the early stages of the war.
[Ref. 8: p. 411]
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Like its enemy, ROK received a tremendous amount of military equipment
during the Korean War. (See Appendix B) Included in this aid were over 800 tanks,
mostly M-47's or M-48's, and Sherman-types. Unlike NK, ROK did not receive any jet
aircraft; ROK relied totally on U.S. air cover. The bulk of the military aid consisted of
infantry' weaponry commensurate with South Korean capabilities. [Ref. 8: p. 407]
The ROK forces emerged from the war in a little better condition than did those
of the North. Although their Army was intact, it relied heavily on the U.S. for support.
The ROK Air Force consisted only of limited numbers of older propeller-type aircraft
with few supplies. The Navy emerged from the war a little better equipped, but it pre-
sented no real threat to NK.
3. THE FIRST DECADE, 1953-1960
By 1955, the Soviets had increased the number of bombers supplied to NK. and
by 1956 they had introduced a new aircraft weapon system, the MIG-17 fighters. The
agreement stood until 195S, at which time it was voided by the United Nations Com-
mand for "alleged North Korean nonadherence/'i [Ref. 8: p. 416]
NORTH KOREA
The North Koreans channeled most of their resentment toward the Soviets, be-
cause of their initiation of the armistice process. Many North Korean leaders directly
blamed the Soviets for their failures, and felt that the enormous loss of Korean lives had
been in vain.
North Korean forces received 20 Il-28's in 1955, and 100 MIG-17 s from 1956
to 1958 to supplement their ageing MIG-15's. In 1959, China supplied North Korea
with SO MIG-15's, and began delivery of 1 1-28's Chinese support continued in 195S-59
with the transfer of 44 1 1-28's, 20 Yak-18's, and 300 Shenyang F-4 aircraft. China also
introduced the first supersonic aircraft, the MIG-I9, into NK in 1959. Between 1957
and 1960, China increased the North Korean naval capability with the transfer of 24
minesweepers. [Ref. 8: p. 364] Aid to NK between 1953 and 1960 shifted from complete
Soviet depence toward an independent course leaning toward Chinese influence.
1 See Appendix A and B for Arms Transfers to NK and ROK.
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Military aid to ROK rose steadily throughout the 1950s, peaking between 1958
and 1960. Actual arms transfers to ROK during the fifties were mostly World War II
surplus items which were obsolete in U.S. inventories. Additionally, these arms were
single weapons (as opposed to weapons systems) which required only minimal mainte-
nance and limited complex spare parts. Although these weapons were outdated in the
U.S. inventory, they filled the needs of th ROK Army, and were commensurate with
their maintenance capabilities. [Ref. 9: p. 288]
Air assets were an exception in arms transfers. Here the ROK received 110 F-86
fighter-bombers, and nine T-33's. These aircraft matched the quality, but not the
quantity supplied to NK during this same time period.
4. THE SECOND DECADE, 1960-1970
NORTH KOREA
NK concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Soviets in 1961 in spite of
growing differences. This was not an acceptance of Soviet dominance, however, for in
this same year. Kim introduced his Seven-Year Economic Development Plan, defying a
Soviet attempt to coordinate and direct all socialist planning efforts. The combination
of defiance in economic planning, and the refusal to accept Soviet military command
dominance, resulted in the cancellation of all Soviet aid. [Ref. 8: p. 413]
China increased its supply of jet fuel and spare aircraft parts to NK in the early
1960's, even though they were badly needed in China. NK reciprocated by reorganizing
its Air Force along Chinese lines. By 1963, the North Koreans had received 400 Chinese
built aircraft, including Shenyang 4 (MIG-17), MIG-15's, and Il-28's. According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), NK's Air Force had ex-
panded to 465 combat aircraft by 1964. During the early sixties, the North Korean
military strength exceeded ROK's by 200-400 percent. [Ref. 8: p. 413]
As a result of substantial Soviet military aid, the North Korean military forces
profited greatly in 1967-1968. By 1967, the North Korean Air Force had over 500
combat aircraft, including 21 MIG-21's, 350 MIG-17's, SO MIG-15's, and SO 11-28
bombers (over half of which were provided by Moscow). Also provided were 10 Air-
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Defense Complexes, including 500 SA-2 missiles. 2 Almost all of NK's heavy army
equipment was Soviet supplied. [Ref. 8: p. 413]
A major development of the self-reliance movement in NK was the initiation
of construction in an indigenous arms production industry. This independent policy re-
sulted in the development of a self-sufficient small arms industry. By the end of the
sixties, NK indigenously produced all of their small arms, including rifles, machineguns,
mortars, as well as the ammuntiton for each item.
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Arms transfers to ROK during the sixties included advanced weapons systems.
In 1961, the Nike Hercules, Honest John, and Hawk missiles were first delivered to ROK
forces. Sixty F-S6 fighter aircraft were also delivered, including approximately 700 ad-
vance Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Although conventional armament continued to
flow, and some new systems were introduced, the share of U.S. aid for new procurement
fell during this period. By 1964-65, almost 80 percent of military aid granted was for
ammunition, parts, food, and training. [Ref. 8: p. 417]
Begining in 1965. partially as part of the quid pro quo, the U.S. started updat-
ing the ROK forces. In 1965, F-5 Freedom Fighters were delivered to supplement and
replace ageing F-S6's. Addition illy, the U.S. promised to fully equip three of ROK s ten
reserve divisions, and to expedite the modernization of all of ROK's front-line forces.
Subsequently, between 1966-1970, ROK received large numbers of tanks, artillery, small
arms, patrol craft, and other military material.
Aid for operations and maintenance increased significantly in 1969-1970. In
1969, S100 million was requested over and above the approved appropriations to update
anti-aircraft systems, patrol boats, and radar. This also authorized a squadron of F-4-E
Phantoms, which ROK had requested earlier. [Ref. 8: p. 417]
5. THE THIRD DECADE, 1970- 19S0
Little change could be noted as the seventies arrived. NK still was essentially
reliant on the Soviet Union for military and economic aid. Since 1969, relations between
NK and China have remained good, but China has been unable to deliver much aid to
NK. Although promises flowed freely between Peking and Pyongyang, material did not.
2 The International Institute of Stratemc Studies (IISS), The Military Balance (London: IISS.
1969). p. 64.
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ROK and U.S. relations remained strong in the early 1970's, but became strained in the
mid-seventies. Changes in the relationships between the suppliers was an important
factor.
NORTH KOREA
NK's relations with the Soviet Union remained critically important during the
early and mid-seventies. The Soviets were still NK's major source of arms, and its major
trading partner. However, Soviet arms transfers and military assistance brought little
increased influence. NK, although dependent on Soviet arms and aid, refused to move
from their position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Soviet-North Korean re-
lations, although cool and formal, were still firm, as was emphasized by the renewal of
their Mutual Defense Treaty in 1976. Underlying Soviet aid to NK was the concern that
renewed violence by Kim would undermine the SALT I agreement and the new-found
detente with the United States.
Actual arms transfers to NK during the seventies did little to improve their of-
fensive capabilities. They received 2S SU-7 fighter-bomber aircraft in 1971, and two
squadrons of MIG-21's between 1974 and 1978. Only the SU-7 could be considered as
improvement, since the MIG-21's were simply replacements for aging aircraft; they
added little to the offensive capability. The ground forces were supplied with 50 T-62
tanks in 1975. [Ref. 9: p. 26S]
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Arms transfers to ROK, like those to NK. were mostly defensive in nature dur-
ing the 1970's. The only real air threat is posed by the 47 F-4-D E aircraft provided to
ROK from 1971-1977. The sale of 60 additional F-4's was approved in 1979, however.
these aircraft were not delivered at that time. Offensive capabilities for ROK ground
forces have been improved by the transfer of over 500 M-4S tanks which ROK converted
to M-48 A-5's.
ROK's defensive capability mushroomed during the seventies. With the addi-
tion of 150 F-5E fighter aircraft delivered in th seventies to their previously acquired
aircraft which included F-4's, ROK became quite capable of defending itself from an
attack. Further reinforcing ROK's defensive capabilities were over 1,500 AIM-9 and
AIM-7 advanced air-to-air missiles, the Nike Hercules, and Hawk surface-to-air missiles,
and the Vulcan 20mm anti-aircraft system added in the seventies.
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6. THE FOURTH DECADE, 1980-1988
The arms race between ROK and NK continues. In spite of domestic unrest,
the ROK's economy now has a very healthy trade surplus through export growth. In
the fourth decade both ROK and NK have greatly increased their indigenous arms in-
dustry capabilities. They want to import high technolodgy arms and develop the skills
necessart to upgrade anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. At this time they can produce
almost all small arms and ammunition for domestic use.
NORTH KOREA
In the fourth decade NK increased their importation of aircraft and missiles.
The Soviets continue to be the main supplier to NK during this decade. China
transfcred 20 F-6 fighter aircraft in 1982, the Soviets supplied 20 MIG-21F in 1983. and
30 M1G-23F in 1984. In 19S5 NK increased their aircraft received by 26 MIG-23F in
19S6 and 24 in 1986. Included were special ammunition and missiles for the aircraft
which were delivered. In 1987 NK requested 3 SU-25 Frogfoot missiles from Soviet
Union and got them in 198S. During the 19S0's NK developed an extensive arms in-
dustry capabilitiy. Now they are seeking high technology arms instead of basic arms and
more aircraft from the Soviet Union.
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
With the growing economy ROK increased their military expenditures on arms
imports. The U.S. is still the major supplier to the ROK. In 19S2. ROK requested
Hawk missiles from the United Kingdom. Negotiation has taken place but deliver}' has
not.
Like the NK, ROK also has a great arms industry capability. Thus more em-
phasis is being placed on increasing their air power and anti-tank power and the number
of missiles. ROK has continuously requested more aircraft from the U.S. throughout
the 19S0's. In 19S0, 15 F-5E's Tiger 2 fighters were requested and delivered in 1982. In
1981, 30 F-16C's and 6 F-16D's were ordered from U.S. and latelv delivered. Four F-4E
Phantom were delivered in 1985 and 24 F-4D Phantomswere again ordered and delivered
between 19S6-87. (See Appendix B) The ROK Army received its first 200 plus
Type-SSMBT (locally manufactured and substantially modified M-l Abrams.) The ROK
can now produce Type-SSMBT with some U.S. support. [Ref. 10: p. 19] These actions
herald a new era for the military arms race on Korean Peninsula.
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The arms race between ROK and \K will continue. As time passes both ROK
and \K increase their arms industry copabilities and raise their portion of co-production
plan with their major allied nations. ROK and NK can produce almost all conventional
small arms and ammunitions. Also they can produce some main battle tank and high-
technological items. Until now both Koreas still rely on their major allied nations in
major arms supplies and production, but when they increase their capability to produce
major weapons, the arms race will be faster than before and it will increase the possibility
of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.
C. ARMS INDUSTRY
Both ROK and NK have been driven by security, economic, and political motives
to develop their own arms industries. These reasons have also pushed them to manu-
facture a growing variety of weapons, both for indigenous use and for export. To date,
arms industries in both Koreas are dependent on foreign technology input; however,
these inputs have developed an indigenous data base, and increased local manufacturing
skills to a point where most systems can be manufactured without relying upon imported
1
parts.
ROK and NK are now manufacturing significant items of military equipment and
are looking for an increasing share of the international arms market.
I. North Korean Indigenous Arms Production
NK has a large and well-developed arms production industry. Current pro-
duction capabilities are shown table 1. (See Table 1). This table is only a "best estimate"
of current production capabilities. Actual production is a state secret; however, unclas-
sified sources were combined to establish these figures. The table also includes equip-
ment indigenously produced under license.
NK produces all equipment for its ground forces. They are belived to have the
capability of manufacturing 20 T-62 tanks per month. ROK sources say NK may have
produced and deployed about 2600 T-62 tanks. NK also produces their own artillery
and light infantry weapons, and the ammunition for each. 3 They established a defense
3 SIPRI Yearbook NS1. P. 364.
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of surface-to-surface missile assembly industry and are now capable of supplying a much
wider range of weapons including SCUD missiles.
4
Table 1. NORTH KOREAN INDIGENOUS ARMS PRODUCTION
ARMY







7.62 TT1933 Pistol (Type-68)
7.62 (AK-47)
7.62 Light Machingun
Mortars 120 mm 160 mm 240 mm







Truck 2.5 Ton GA2-53 4*4
AAA 37 mm 57 mm 85 mm
Plus Ammunition For All Basic Weapons
NAVY
Gun-Boats Chaho Class Chong Lin Class
Landing Craft
Nampo Class
1CM Type LCI Type
Patrol Boats Taechong Class
Frigate Najin Class
Submarines MidgetClass Remeo Class
AIRFORCE Fighter Aircraft M1G-21(?)
source: Multiple sources
Most of the indigenously produced equipment in NK is of the older Soviet de-
sign. The simple design characteristics of this equipment eliminates most of the tech-
4 Asian Defense Journal, March, 1989, p. 28.
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nological problems involved in arms production. Being simple in design also allows for
easy maintenance.
\K has developed a small navy well-suited for its need. In recent years, North
Korea has been producing most of its naval vessel's.
\K received permission.to manufacture the MIG-21 under license in 1974. To
date, there is no indication that North Korea has been able to master aircraft pro-
duction. [Ref. 11: p. 147]
NK now has a fully developed weapons industry. It is not sophisticated in the
equipment it manufactures (Soviet and Chinese standard bloc items) and there remains
a lagging electronics industry to support production of modern fire control and gun
laying computers. 5 Despite some of the weaknesses of the arms industry, NK has be-
come increased their arms production and export. Should they decide to disrupt peace
on the Korean Peninsula they could supply nearly all their own military arms and am-
munition.
2. Republic of Korean indigenous Arms Production
ROK did not enter the arms production industry until the mid-seventies; how-
ever, by 19SS they had some million dollars worth of arms exports. The enormous
growth in the arms industry was fueled by ROK's highly skilled and educated populace,
combined with massive U.S. support. It has allowed ROK to become almost totally
self-sufficient in weapons production.
ROK is almost totally self-sufficient in the production of equipment for their
ground forces. They manufacture all of their light infantry weapons and towed 105mm
and 155mm howitzers. (See Table2)
ROK is still dependent on the U.S. for advanced infantry weapons which require
U.S. technical support. With U.S. support, South Korea has steadily increased the
quality and quantity of weapons production.
ROK's naval production is one of th fastest growing industries in Korea. ROK
has developed a small prototype submarine. This was produced despite U.S. claims that
ROK did not need a submarine force. Currently, ROK lacks the technical expertise to
enter full-scale production of modern submarines, but the production of the prototype
is a major technical break through. Also, procuring the submarine production over U.S.
objections shows a growing independence in the ROK arms industry.
5 Ibid., p. 35.
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Table 2. REPUBLIC OF KOREAN INDIGENOUS ARMS PRODUCTION
ARMY







Infantry Weapons M-16 K-l ,2
Mortar 60 mm 81 mm 4.2"
MRL M-72 M-203
Recoilless Rifle 90mm 106mm 157mm
Plus Ammunition For All Basic Weapons
XAVY Fast Patrol Boats PSMM -5 Class
Submarines Small Prototype
AIRFORCE




ROK and U.S. coproducc the Huges 500D helicopter in-country. They also
produce most of the components of the F-5 E.'F aircraft indigenously. Only the F-5
engines, and a certain amount of airframe parts are fully coproduced. The U.S. has
supplied ROK with full logistical support packages, all production tooling, data, and
training and technical assitance. This will greatly improve South Korea's aircraft tech-
nology program, and speed up their F-5 indigenous production development. [Ref. 11:
pp. 147-148]
One of the significant improvements in the arms industry of ROK is the K-l
Main Battle Tank coproduction with U.S. support. The K-l is a slightly smaller
(7,'Sth-size) version of the U.S. Army's M-l Abrams; this is more suited to the Korean
Peninsula's hilly terrain. The new MBT, the product of joint U.S.-ROK design efforts,
was known as the XK-1 during the prototype stage. Technical assistance in the design
and development of the K-l was furnished by General Dynamics, Land Systems Divi-
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sion, the main contractor for the M-l Abrams. Production of the K-l began in 1985
and over 200 production vehicles have been delivered to the ROK Army. The South
Korean manufacturing giant is producing the K-l at its tank plant in Chang-won.
6
Nowadays ROK has cumulated high technology skills for producing arms and
has gradually become an arms export nation. This capability has increased their ability
to defense themselves from a North Korean's attack.
D. MILITARY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
The military competition between ROK and NK has continued and both Koreas
military expenditures have increased. The two Koreas allocate considerable resources
to security: the North Korean provision of some 12% of GDP for defensi in 1988 re-
presents a slight increase in real terms; while ROK allocated just under 5% of GDP in
1987. an increase of nearly 2% in real terms. [Ref. 10: p. 20]
This section will provied an overview of the total military situation of the Korean
Peninsula before comparing the tank gap between NK and ROK.
NORTH KOREA
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the NK
v
armed forces number approximately 83S.OOO. The NK Army is the central element,
numbering 750.000. The army is believed to be organized into 24 infantry divisions of
about 1 1.000 men each, three armored divisions, five mechanized and motorized infantry
divisions and two anti-aircraft divisions. The army also has independent brigades and
regiments, including seven armored brigades, nine infantry brigades (up to 8.500 men
each), 250 artillery batallions and 80 rocket batallions. There is a commando force of
over 20 brigades estimated to number up to 100,000 men. [Ref. 12: pp. 126-12"]
The Major items of ground weaponry for the army are:
(1) Tanks and assault guns: over 3,500 including 3,000 T-54, T-55, T-62 tanks and
the SU-100 assult gun. The T-62 is a main Soviet battle tanks, and U.S. military officials
believe the North Korean version of the T-62 is similar to the Soviet model. Pyong-yang
now mav have well over 500 T-62's.7
6 Asian Defense Journal, Nov. 1987. p. 82.
7 Korea Herald. July 30, 19S3. General Robert Sennewald, U.S. Commander in Korea, stated
that the North Koreans had converted several infantry divisions to "mechanized or truck-mobile
status."
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(2) Armored personnel carriers and trucks: 1,000 Soviet-designed BTR 40/50/60/152
vehicles. The BTR-50 and BTR- 152 have the largest passenger capacity (19-20 riflemen).
Both can transport heavy weapons.
(3) Artillery 4,50 guns including towed guns and howitzers from 76mm to 152mm.
The 122mm, 130mm, and 152mm guns have a range of between 13 and 17 miles.
(4) Mortars: 11,000 including the 60mm and 82mm mortars, which can be trans-
ported by an individual, and the heavier and destructive 120mm and 160mm types, which
must be transported by crews or vehicles.
(5) Anti-aircraft guns: 8,000 ranging from 23mm to 100mm towed guns, the ZSU-23
self-propelled gun and the ZSU-57 self-propelled gun.
(6) Multiple rocket launchers: 2,000 including 900 of a North Korean version of the
BM-31 122mm rocket launchers with 30 tubes mounted on trucks.
(7) Long range missiles: \K has maintained a force of Soviet model Frog 5 and Frog
7 surface missiles, which are capable of reaching Seoul from North Korean territory. In
1985, NK reportedly began receiving SCUD-B surface to surface missiles from the
Soviet Union. The SCUD missiles have a much greater range and could hit targets in
the central part of ROK.
(8) Anti-tank weapons: 1,500 B-10 82mm recoilless anti-tank guns plus 45mm,
57mm, 75mm, and 107mm anti-tank guns. The North Korean army acquired the AT-3
Sagger anti-tank missile system. [Ref. 2: p. 256] ' '
The North Korean air force has 53,000 personel and an estimated 700 combat air-
craft. Many are old, however, including some 280 MlG-15s and MIG-17s. The back-
bone of the air force arc twelve squadrons of 160 MIG-21s, a Soviet designed aircraft
of the 1960s, and 160 MIG-19s, most of which have been provided in recent years by
China. The M1G-21 was the Soviet Union's main fighter aircraft in the 1960's but has
been replaced by the MIG-23 and MIG-27. It can be used as an interceptor, with air
to air missiles, or in a ground attack role with rockets or bombs. It has a combat range
of nearly 700 miles.
NK is aquiring MIG-23 aircraft from the Soviet Union. Estimates of the number
NK will receive range from 30 to 50. The MIG-23 is primarily an air combat, air defense
weapon. NK has acquired at least 80 U.S. Hughes 500-C helicopters through a West
German smuggling operation. These are similar to Hughes helicopters in ROK's arsenal
and could be used in a ground attack role with rockets, machine guns, or anti-tank
missiles; or they could be used to transport troops.
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The navy comprises 35,000 personnel and an estimated 20 submarines (Soviet and
Chinese models), with torpedo and mine laying capabilities, four frigates, and 350 vari-
ous light fast-attack and coastal patrol craft with guns, surface to surface missiles, and
torpedoes. Most of these craft are 1960's-vintage of Soviet design with Chinese models
added. The navy also has over 100 high-speed naval landing craft, which have a trans-
port capacity of 3,000 troops.
XK's reserve forces are based on the concept of an entire populace in a constant
state of readiness militarily and ideologically to defend the country and support the
regular armed forces. [Ref. 2: p. 257]
A relatively new development are reports that NK has chemical warfare capabilities.
ROK's defense minister stated March 1986 that NK has stockpiled 180-270 tons of
chemical weapons, including gases. He noted that mortars, field guns, and SCUD mis-
siles could fire chemical agents, including long range delivery.
8
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The ROK armed forces of 600,000 are the largest non-communist military body in
East Asia. The armed forces are also one of the best trained and equipped. They liave
had a singular military mission since the end of the Korean War: defeat any new inva-
sion of ROK by the North Koreans.
The ROK army numbered 520,000 in 19SS. The army is organized into field armies,
corps, divisions, regiments, batallions, and small units in a manner similar to that of the
U.S. Army. It has 19 infantry divisions, two mechanized infantry divisions, two anti-
aircraft artillery brigades, two surface-to-surface missile brigades, and seven special
forces brigades.
The weaponry, equipment, and organization of the ROK army reveal a force ori-
ented to a defensive posture. Artillery and antitank weapons make up the bulk of heavy
equipment. Artillery consists mainly of 3.000 towed 105mm howitzers and towed
155mm howitzers. ROK now manufactures these weapons. The 155mm howitzers have
a firing range of approximately 15 miles, while the 105mm guns have a range of over
seven miles. Other artillery include about 100 M-107, M-109, and M-l 10 self-propelled
guns. The range of these weapons is between ten and twelve miles. Additional firepower
comes from about 180 World War II vintage M-18 and M-36 self-propelled antitank
guns. [Ref. 12: p. 12S]
S Radio Seoul, March 20, 1QS6.
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ROK armor is integrated into the infantry with one tank batallion attached to each
infantry division. The two mechanized infantry divisions, comprising six tank batallions,
is the only mobile attack force. ROK has 1,300 M-47 and M-48 tanks and 200 K-l
tanks (similar to U.S.'s M-l Abrams). Most of them are equipted with 105mm gun.
The lu: ;mm gun on Israeli tanks proved effective against the Soviet-made T-62 tanks
during the 1973 Middle East war. ROK coproduced K-l tanks with assistance from
General Dynamics Corporation. Four hundred-fifty M-l 13 and 250 Fiat 6614 armored
personnel carriers provide a degree of mobility for infantry. The M-l 13 is a standard
U.S. army vehicle and has a capacity of 14 infantrymen; the Fiat can carry six. Other
key items are 5,300 81mm and 107mm mortars and recoilless launchers (57mm, 75mm,
and 106mm).
ROK's air force is built around 330 F-5 interceptors, over 250 of which have added
ground attack weaponry. The air force soon will add 36 F-16s, 36 F-5Es, and 32 F-5F
fighters. New armament will include the Sidewinder air to air missile and the Maverick
air-to-ground missile. [Ref. 2: p. 269]
The navy has eleven destroyers, seven frigates, and nearly 100 coastal patrol craft.
It is emphasizing a strengthened coastal craft force, particularly through procurement
rof fast attack craft armed with surface to surface missiles.
ROK receives support from nearly 43,000 U.S. troops inside the country and by U.S.
forces elsewhere in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Second Infantry Division is a key unit
in Korea. It numbers 13,900 and is strategically located in the 25 mile corridor sepa-
rating the capital city of Seoul and the DMZ. The division is heavily armed with artil-
lery, anti-tank weaponry, and tanks.
The United States maintains twelve tactical fighter squadrons and other combat
aircraft in the Western Pacific. Four air force squadrons are located in Seoul Korea;
three of these (72 aircraft) are composed of F-16 fighters. Another is composed of 24
A- 10 close ground support aircraft. Another three squadrons (72 aircraft) of F-15
fighters are on Okinawa, and the U.S. Air Force rotates these in and out of ROK At any-
time, there are three to five F-15s in ROK9 Two squadrens of F-16s are at Misawa in
Japan.
The quality, morale, and discipline of ROK troops has improved steadily since the
Korean War through Korean participation in the Vietnam War to the present. The ed-
9 "Special Report: U.S. Pacific Air Forces Modernization." Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology, February 7, 1983, p. 53.
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ucation level and technical sophistication of ROK enlisted personnel has grown. U.S.
officers in ROK rate ROK commanders highly in terms of intelligence, professionalism,
and ability to command troops in the field. The training level and education level of
officers is high. [Ref. 2: p. 269]
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III. NUMERICAL AND STATIC COMPARISON OF TANK GAP
BETWEEN ROK AND NK
Before the Korean War, high quality Soviet T-34 tanks were transferee! to NK in
large numbers and played a central role in achieving victory over the ROK in the be-
ginning of the Korean War. Thereafter, tank forces have continued to be seen by NK
as a key element in preparation for war on the Korean Peninsula. As a result of the
tank' symbolic importance, it is generally assumed that NK retains a substantial lead
over ROK in numbers of tanks.
According to recently declassified data from military reports, i.e., The Military Bal-
ance, 19S7-19SS, NK outnumbers the ROK in tanks. It is less clear how this numerical
advantage translates into an advantage between ROK and NK tank capability. That
relationship depends not only on numbers but on the quality of tanks and on other
factors.
The anticipated tank battle scenario on the Korean Peninsula is much different from
a scenario in Europe. The Korean Peninsula is mostly mountainous terrain except in the
western area of the peninsula. Direct battles between tanks will probably not occur in
the mountainous areas. Therfore most of the tanks can be used to exploit initial pene-
trations with mobility and firepower. From this point of view, understanding the or-
ganization of armored forces provides a foundation of knowledge before making any
comparisons between the two countries.
This chapter provides the organization of armored forces of ROK and NK. It fo-
cuses on a numerical comparison of tanks between ROK and NK with and without U.S.
support of the ROK. It also provides a comparison from the static point of view.
Comparison methods for evaluating the tank gap on the Korean Peninsula care cri-
tiqued.
This section will look at what is commonly believed to be the most important single
category of equipment currently held by ground forces: the tank. Because this thesis
focuses on this single weapon category, we will not attempt to assess other ground forces
equipment, such as artillery and other armored vehicles.
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A. THE ORGANIZATION OF ARMORED FORCES OF NK AND ROK
1. North Korea's Armored Forces
North Korean offensive doctrines will not differ greatly from those of the Soviet
Union, with mixed Chinese concepts included as a result of earlier fighting experience
during the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War.
According to an unclassified U.S. Army publication issued in the early-eighties,
"tanks are combined with other arms at all echelons. Armor is used to exploit initial
penetrations with mobility and fire power. Doctrine, history, and terrain suggest that
armored units in the XK will probably be employed piecemeal in support of the
infantry."!
According to recently declassified data from Asia 1989 Yearbook, NK has one
Armed Division, three Mechanized Divisions, twenty-five Infantry Divisions and fifteen
Armored Brigade. The fifteen Armored brigade can be considered a division level.
The organization of each armored division contains some 282 main battle tanks
(MBTs), consisting of T-54/-55/-62 mediums. Additionally, the unit has 24 light
amphibious reconnaissance tanks (either Type-62 or PT-76s), plus 108 infantry-carrying
vehicles (APCs). Twelve armored recovery vehicles (based on the T-34 Classes) are also
organic to the division. The mechanized infantry division places greater emphasis on
infantry and their supporting weapons with 93 medium tanks, 16 light reconnaissance
tanks, and 8 recovery vehicles T-34-T Model BH
Tanks are also spread among other units, with the basic Army Corps having 31
medium and two light amphibious reconnaissance tanks. These vehicles are part of the
assigned infantry division within each corps. There is also an Independent Armored
Regiment that normally has a table of equipment (TOE) of 96 medium and 16
light reconnaissance tanks, derived from the three Tank Battalions, 34 medium tanks
(three assigned to battalion headquarters) and two light reconnaissance tanks. This in-
dependent armored regiment also has an organic Armored Reconnaissance Company,
equipped with ten light reconnaissance tanks. The regiment also has four T-34-T Model
B recovery tanks (ARV). (See Figure 2 and 3)
The independent armored regiments have been assigned alongside infantry divi-
sions attached to the various Corps organizations. It may well be that NK now has
sufficient tanks to upgrade former regiments to brigade strength. Such an armored force
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Figure 1. NK's ARMOR DIVISION-STRATEGIC FORCES COMMAND
upgrading has taken place in the last three or four years, that it is likely the new brigades
are equipped with domestically-produced T-62 MBTs.12
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Figure 2. NK's BASIC CORPS INDEPENDENT ARMOR REGIMENT
2. Republic of Korean's Armored Forces
The terrain of ROK requires that certain "avenues" be followed by armored
forces. Despite this tactical disadvantage with regard to armored warfare, it would ap-
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Figure 3. NK's BASIC DIVISIONAL TANK BATTALION
pear that the NK is intent upon raising a sufficient armored force to ram its way through
combined U.S.-ROK defenses south of the DMZ. Once Seoul has been isolated, then
major armored thrusts would be expected to be undertaken down the Western Coast of
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the peninsula, as well as some armored thrusts aimed through the central valleys of the
country. Despite today's modern weapons on the battlefield and the reequipping ofXK
and ROK, geography will continue to play a dominant role in any future Korean War.
The Far East Economy Review (FEER) lists in its Asia 1989 Yearbook.thai the
ROK Las two mechanized infantry divisions and 19 infantry divisions. Each mechanized
infantry division contains three brigades. Each three brigades contains three mechanized
infantry battalion, 3 motorized battalions, 3 tank battalions, one reconnaissance battal-
ion and one field artillery brigade. Each infantry division has one tank battalion. Tanks
are spread among units. Each tank battalion has almost 50 MBTs, consistion of
M-47/M-48A5. Some tank battalion equipped with K-lMBTs. (Type-88, similar to M-l
Abram of U.S. MBT)
The general assessment is that NK has three months of war supplies on hand,
before either Chinese or Soviet assistance would be required. While NK's armored
forces are only a small part of the over-all military equation between NK and ROK, they
may assume much greater importance (and firepower) as an 'exploitation force' once the
DMZ is breached.
B. NUMERICAL COMPARISON METHOD
1. Appling Numerical Comparision Method
The first stage in assessing the balance between the tank forces of the two
Koreas is to set out the numbers held on both sides. The main source is Asia 19S9
Yearbook, published annually by the Far Easten Economic Review.
The quantitative balance of tank forces in Korean Peninsula would depend on
the number of tanks with which NK is preparing for an attack and on the number of
tanks ROK possesses at that time. Also, the U.S. is expected to respond to NK's prep-
arations for war. Although U.S. officials maintain that the ROK would become aware
of the NK's attack, it is generally assumed that the ROK would only have several hours
advance notice of NK's attack. For planning purposes. ROK headquarters analysts
have assumed 12-24 hours advance notice. This is considered the worst case scenario,
by the U.S., for advance notice. Some observers worry that a 12-24 hours may be an
optimistic assumption. Of course, ROK will respond more promptly to warning.
According to the recently declassified data from military reports, NK has a sig-
nificant advantage in numbers of tanks. (See Table 3) Without U.S. support the ROK









Figure 4. ROK's BASIC DIVISIONAL TANK BATTALION
the ROK in number of tanks. Table 3 shows how many of each model the two nations
currently possess.






































Source: Far East Economy Review, Asia I9S9 Yearbook, pp. 149-153.
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The security of the ROK is supported by the Mutual Defense Treaty which it
signed with the USA in 1953, and by the nuclear-capable U.S. deterrent forces which
are stationed near the DMZ which seperates it from XK.
The ROK and United States Forces Korea (USFK) are closely integrated under
an organization called the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Formed in November
1978, the CFC's stated objective is "To deter hostile acts of external aggression against
the ROK by a combined military effort of the USA and the ROK and, in the event de-
terrence fails, defeat an external armed attack against the ROK. "13
USAF ground forces are grouped under the Eighth United Stated Army (EUSA)
which was the core military force with in the United Nations Command during the
Korean War. EUSA's principal combat unit is the 2nd Infantry Division. This division
is heavily armed with artillery, anti-tank weaponry and tanks. Within 2nd Infantry Di-
vision the 1st Brigade comprises two battalions of armor with M60A3 tanks and one
mechanized infantry battalion. The number of MBTs in the USAF are 150 M60A3
tanks. When these tanks are added to the ROK's number of tanks the ratio between
NK and U.S.-ROK tank gap decreases to 2.1:1. Although the U.S. M60A3 tanks have
a high warfare capability and quality it reduced the gap only a small amount from a
numerical standpoint.
Outside the ROK. two thirds of the U.S. Third Marine Division is on Okinawa.
The 25th Infantry Division and the remaining one third of the Marine Division, both
located in Hawaii, back up units in the Western Pacific. The U.S. prepared 1.200 re-
inforcement tanks to support any conflict as soon as possible. [Ref. 2: p. 258] When
these tanks support the ROK the tank gap ratio become more balanced. At this point
USAF plays a greater role in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula.
A longer conflict with limited outside reinforcement would require a more mo-
bile ROK army for the purpose of elastic defense and counter-offensive operations.
Steps to enhance these capabilities could require a 50 to 100 percent increase in the
number of tanks in order to form two or three armored or additional mechanized divi-
sions as a strategic reserve.
2. Qualitative Comparison of the Tank on the Numerical Comparison Gap
The numerical comparison method is totally dependent on the number of tanks
possessed by NK and ROK. The tanks of both NK and the ROK consist of a range of
13 International Defense Review, Vol. 19, 19S6. p. 193.
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different models. Some models are new, some have been upgraded with the latest
technology,some were designed as early as the 1940s and some are likely to be cf little
use in a modern battle. ROK's most powerful tank is the K-l MBT (similar to the
Leopard 2 and the M-l Abram of U.S. tank), which were transfered to the ROK from
the U.S. in 1988. K-l is equipped with the latest available technology, which remains
significantly ahead of that incorporated in the most modern Soviet tanks, the T-64, T-72
and T-80. NK's latest tanks are the T-62 which have less capability than T-64. There-
fore, the ROK possesses some tanks that are more capable than NK's.
ROK has followed a policy of carrying-out a major upgrade of its M-47, M-48
tanks to ensure that, although the bodies of these tanks are 20 or more years old, the
technology is almost comparable to that on its most modern tanks. As a consequence,
the quality gap between old and new-generation models, although it exists, is relatively
small. In contrast, older models of NK tanks, -the T-34, T-54. T-55 and T-62, have not
been significantly upgraded, and are thus falling further and further behind the ROK
tanks of comparable age, such as the M-48. [Ref. 13 : p. 26]
The main reason the earlier models of NK tanks cannot be upgraded signif-
icantly at a tolerably low cost is that their original design emphasized cheap mass pro-
duction and low weight at the expense of quality and adaptability. This choice was not
an arbitrary one. Rather, it was a reflection of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
NK's industry: technological backwardness combined with a considerable capacity for
large-scale production.
One of the most telling indicators of this choice is the relatively low weight of
NK tanks. Today the average NK tank weights only 35.3 metric tons compared with
49 metric tons for the ROK. (See Table 3) While the NK has 2.32:1 lead in numbers of
tanks, it has a lead of only 1.66:1 in total tank tonnage. When the U.S. M60A3 is added
to the ROK tank forces. NK only has lead of 1.5:1 in total tank tonnage.
One could debate at length whether weight would be a better indicator of the
relative capabilities of the two sides than a raw number count. At this stage, however,
it seems more fruitful to examine in detail what is known about the fighting quality of
both side's tanks. This thesis looks at the four capabilities which are of greatest impor-
tance in determining tank quality; observation, firepower, mobility and armor pro-
tection.
OSERVATION
In order to perform effectively, tank crews must be able to see what is happen-
ing. It is widely acknowledged that the earlier Soviet tank models (T-54, T-55 and T-62)
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are far inferior to any older 1950 U.S. tank mades in the all round orientation capability
which they give the crew, especially the commander. Soviet tank models have fewer and
smaller viewing points on commanders cupolas, thus commanders have to stick their
heads out more often to observe their surroundings. The more modern ROK tanks
(M-4SA5 and K-1MBT) are equipped with high performance thermal imaging, which
provides not only near-perfect nightvision, but is also useful during the day in the "fog
of battle." (See Appendix C) This would give a major advantage to a ROK tank
commander, particularly at night, for he would be able to see his opponent trying to see
him, but not vice versa. [Ref 13: p. 29]
FIREPOWER
In order to be effective, tanks need the capability to destroy targets as quickly
and accurately as possible, which is a function of both weapons and ammunition and
of sights and fire control. In the ROK the most common gun now in service in tanks
(M-48A3, K-1MBT) is the British L7 (rifled) 105mm. The L7 compares favorably with
the 100mm D10T rifled gun with which the older \K T-54s are equipped. 14 The L7
packs a harder punch, with a muzzle velocity for its fastest round of 1,525 meters per
second, compared with the DIOT's 1,415 meters per second. It also derives considerable
advantage from its greater accuracy of fire. 15
ROK tanks, in addition to possessing higher quality guns, also on average carry
more ammunition. The M-4SA5, for example, carries 62 rounds respectively, compared
with only 43 and 40 rounds for the T-55 and T-62. This augments the ROK tank's
greater staying power on the battlefields. On XK tanks, the commander's and gunner's
sights used in targeting generally exhibit a low level of sophistication. Most of the NK's
T-34, T-54, T-55 and T-62 tanks still have only the inadequate base-on-target system.
By comparison, because of the U.S. s technological lead over the Soviet Union
throuchout the 1950s and 1960s, virtuallv all of ROK tanks now in service have either
14 The Chinese, who have built the D10T under license, are no longer satisfied with its per-
formance. They have now integrated a derivative of the L7 into their most recent tank design. Bob
Furious, "ASIANDEX, Part I: China launches defense export drive." International Defense Review,
Vol. 20, No. 1 (1987), pp. 23-27. Other information from "Battle Tanks Supplement," PP. 43-87.
15 An old Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot round from an L7 gun used on an M60 reaches
a velocity of 1,426 meters per second, "battle Tanks Supplement," p. 64; the new Israeli-designed
Armor Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot round used in the West German Army, or the very
similar round used by the U.S. Army, reaches 1,525 meters per second. Von Senger und Ftterlin.
Tanks of the World, p. 731.
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a base-on-own-vehicle optical system or the modern laser system. 16 In order to give ac-
curate instructions to the gun, tanks also need to be able to integrate range data quickly
with other data (temperature of ammunition, wind speed and direction, air density and
humidity, ammunition type, etc). NK's tanks are not equipped with ballistic computers
to integrate range data, however, ROK's K-l MBT are equipped with ballistic comput-
ers. [Ref. 13: pp. 29-32]
MOBILITY
Tanks require tactical mobility in order to gain advantageous firing positions
rapidly and dodge enemy fire. They also require operational marches in a wide area to
mass at the right spot, at the right time. Several indicators of tactical mobility, i.e.,
mobility during battle, strongly suggest that the average XK tanks will have less accel-
eration and flexibility than its ROK counterpart and will find it more difficult to nego-
tiate rocky and hilly terrain during battle.
First, the power weight ratio is crucial in derterminining both speed and accel-
eration. As table 4 shows, the power weight ratio of ROK-U.S. appears to have es-
tablished a clear lead over the XK model's.














K-l 1,100 55 20.0
U.S. MooA 3 572 51 11.2
XK T-54, 55
427 36 11.9
T-62 427 38 11.2
* Figures for automotive power taken from von Senger und Etterlin, Tanks of the World
(19S3 ed.j, pp. 724-730. Source: International Security Vol. 13.
16 A few older series M-47 tanks may still use a range-finding heavy machine gun
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Second, the standard of transmission and steering determines to a large extent
how quickly and flexibly the tank driver can respond to changing battle and terrain
conditions. Therefore they can play a significant role in tank survivability and optimal
fire allocation. Here NK tanks are at considerable disadvantage, with their typical
gearbox and steering mechanism- representing technology that can only be described as
ancient; manually-handled gearbox, mostly only partially synchronized, plus clutch and
brake for steering. By comparison, the R.OK standard includes automatic gearboxes and
hydrostatic hydrodynamic steering; which increases automotive flexibility considerably.
Finally, the degree of road wheel travel, which is a function of suspension type
and spring elasticity, affects terrain negotiation. For both the NK's T-54 and the T-62,
overall (up and down) road wheel travel is around 160mm. For ROK and U.S.'s M-48
and M-60A3 is 320mm, while the K-l has a road wheel travel of just under 500mm.
NK's military doctrine puts more emphasis on operational mobility than on
tactical quality of battle tanks: that NK philosoply dictates production of large numbers
.of relatively inexpensive tanks, which can then be swiftly concentrated in order to gain
overwhelming local superiority along vital axes of attack. If this superiority is achieved,
it is argued, the relatively poor quality of individual NK tank may matter less than tlieir
numbers. Analysist say the real-ability of Soviet model tanks are much less than U.S.
model. [Ref. 13: p. 33]
ARMOR PROTECTION
Tanks require some capability to move and fight under fire without immediately
seeking safety in evasive movements or protective terrain. Therefore all tanks were fit-
ted, until the late 1960s, with armor made from specially hardened steel ("rolled
homogenous armor," or RHA). Specific weights of armor plate did not vary significantly
between the NK and ROK. Protection against attack with kinetic energy rounds was a
function mainly of the thickness of the armor applied.
From the late 1960s on, however, there was a rapid development of modern
"composite armor" by a British Royal Ordnance team led by Richard Simpkin. The
"recipe" has been a closely guarded secret, but composite armor usually consists of layers
of plates of different types of very hard steel and other metals (e.g., aluminum)
sandwiched with ceramics, glass or man-made fibres. Compared with traditional RHA,
composite armor is estimated to have up to 1.5 times as much protection from kinetic
energy rounds and between 2 and 3 times as much protection from shaped -charge am-
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munition. All K-1MBT armor protection is composite armor fitted. This means K-l
MBT have increased survivability on the battlefields.
The Soviets have prepared their T-64B, T-72M1, and T-80 tanks for fitting with
"reactive armor." But NK's tanks does not fitting with reactive armor. Reactive armor
is -llaj'cr of lightweigh explosive elements that look like bricks. It is designed to neu-
tralize the effect of the small caliber shaped-charge warheads typical ofmany lightweight
anti-tank weapons. When a shaped charge hits a panel of reactive armor, the panel ex-
plodes, disrupting the formation of the high-pressure jet of metal and gases which shaped
charges use to penetrate armor.
Reactive armor, however, provides Soviet model tanks with only limited pro-
tection against U.S. tanks. U.S. tanks do carry shaped charges and fragmentation
rounds for use against other targets, such as infantry and light armor. But their main
anti-tank weapon is the kinetic energy round, which relies on its high velocity -over a
mile per second- to penetrate enemy armor. Compared with shaped charges, the effec-
tiveness of these rounds is likely to be much less affected by Soviet reactive armor.
The Soviet disadvantage in the technology of armor protection is greatly com-
pounded by the upper weigh limit of its tank designs, a result of weak engine technology.
Even if the Soviet Union equals Western countries and the U.S. in armor technology,
they would be unable to apply that technology effectively because of their small tank
size. As a result, almost all T-54, T-55 and T-62 tanks in service are fitted with neither
composite nor reactive armor. In this standpoint ROK tanks have increased reliability
and survivability on the battlefields. [Ref. 13: p. 39]
OTHER FACTORS IX TANK PERFORMANCE
Other factors can affect a tank's performance, although to a lesser degree. The
factors are also likely to vary in influence according to the context in which the tanks
are to be used. Soviet tank models are, in general, more difficult to live and fight in than
the relatively more spacious U.S. models. U.S.-ROK tanks have more capability in night
battle than NK tank. Also, U.S-ROK tanks have an automatic range finder and use
Ballistic computer to control fire. NK's tanks do not have these systems. (See Appendix
C) Some U.S.-ROK tanks have the capability to shoot while in moving with high ac-
curacy.
These kind of quality terms should be considered whenever making a compar-
ison between the two countries. The numerical comparison results of the tank gap be-
tween ROK and NK should be decreased due to the quality terms. In recent years,
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though it appears that the tank gap between XK and ROK tanks has been widening still
further.
C. STATIC COMPARISON
Rather than rely on simple counts, a static comparison method can be used that not
only reflects the quantity of weapons but also their quality and the time lines of tank
arrival in the battle areas. Static comparison methods consider only the total of forces
available to each side at a given time. They do not attempt to account for the progress
of fighting or combat losses on either side. Such methods can, however, be used to ex-
amine how the balance changes as mobilization progresses and more forces become
available to each side.
The static method used in this thesis is based on weapon effectiveness indices (WEI)
and weighted unit values (WUV) developed by the U.S. Army. The WEI/WUV method
avoids, as much as possible, subjective assumptions concerning the conduct of war. This
technique first evaluates and ranks each type of ground weapon-such as a tank, per-
sonnel carrier, or howitzer-- relative to other weapons of the same type, to arrive at an
effectiveness index for each weapon. Weapons are typically evaluated on the basis of
their firepower, mobility and ability to survive an enemy attack. Thus, various types of
tanks receive WEI scores and are then ranked against a norm, which for tanks is the
U.S. M60A1. For example, the M60A1. as the norm receives a WEI of 1.00; the
M60A3, an upgraded version of the M60A1, an index of 1.11 based on its improved fire
control system and power train; and the M1A1 Abram, the newest U.S. tank a WEI of
1.34 because of its overall superiority. The Soviet version T-62 tank, when measured
against the category standard of a U.S. M60A1 tank with a WEI of 1.00, has a WE] of
1.03. [Ref. 14: pp. 13-14]
This thesis compares only NK and ROK tanks. As assumed earlythe Capter One,
both the Koreas tank's capabilities are the same model of their allied nations tank's ca-
pabilities. From this point of view. ROK's newest model of tank (K-l MBT) has a WEI
score of 1.34 like the M1A1 Abram of U.S. tank. According to Mako's U.S. Ground
Force and the Defense of Ceniural Europe, published by the Brooking Institution. 1983,
the Soviet T-55 tank's WEI score is 0.S9 and the average value for a given force of T-54,
1-55, T-62, T-64 and T-72 tanks is a WEI score of 1.02. [Ref. 15: PP. 114-123] NK does
not have any T-64 and T-72 that are updated beyond the T-62. Therefore, NK's average
WEI score should be below than 1.00. ROK's K-l MBT have 1.34 WEI score. ROK's
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M-47 and M-48A5 tanks are older model of the U.S. M60A1, so these two tanks have
an average WEI score below 1.00. For comparison purposes let the NK's average WEI
score of T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62 equal 1.00 and the ROK's average WEI score for M-47
and M-48A5 equal 1.00. From this, the results in Table 5 are derived.

































U.S. M60A3 150 1.11 55.00 (De-
fensive)
9,157.5
Source: William P. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and Defense of Centura! Europe,
Washington, D.C., 19S3, pp. 113-125.
Relying on the table, NK's WUV is 222,400 and the ROK's WUV is 86,240 and the
tank gap ratio between NK and ROK becomes 2.58:1. When U.S. tanks added to
ROK's tanks the ratio decreased to 2.33:1.
When the static comparison model is evaluated with the numerical comparison
model, the static comparison model indicates a greater imbalance in the tank gap be-
tween NK and ROK. That is, the NK scores a higher category weight (64.00) than ROK
(55.00) because assumed that NK will break the peace.
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE COMPARISON METHODS
Like any analysis that attempts to quantify the many aspects that contribute to
military capability, the WEI/WUV approach suffers from several important drawbacks.
One obvious drawback is the lack of more recent WEIs for the individual tanks currentlv
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in NK and ROK. This analysis, however, does not propose to be a precise evaluation
of either NK's and ROK's tanks capability.
Numerical and static comparisons ignore other decisive variables, such as strategy,
maneuver, terrain, and combat attrition, that determine the conduct of war. Such
comparisons, therefore, are more valuable for assessing the relative standing of opposing
forces before a war starts and are more useful for evaluating deterrence capability rather
than war-fighting ability.
These analytic methods also ignore many attributes of a military unit-such as
quality and training of personnel, support equipment, logistic capability, and the inter-
play of various weapons-that can determine the outcome of a particular battle. Despite
their importance, however, these factors often do not lend themselves to easy translation
into numerical values. Such comparisons are obviously subjective and not as amendable
to quantification as tank range, accuracy, or speed. This is the case, too, with resupply
and maintenance capability. Everyone knows that efficient ammunition and fuel resup-
ply is necessary for the effective operation of a combat unit, but very few analysts have
suggested ways to quantify such a capability.
Also, the WEI WUV method assumes that the added benefit of additional weapons
is linear—that is. more weapons of any kind continue to provide the same additional ca-
pability as the first such weapon. This assumption is called "constant marginal utility"
in economic jargon and ignores the fact that, beyond a certain point, additional weapons
of one kind might be redundant and therefore of no added utility. For this reason,
WEI WUV scored should not be used by themselves to determine the optimal mix of
weapons in a division.
Together these various limitations suggest that assessments of the conventional
balance using numerical comparison and WEI. WUV scores cannot predict the outcome
of a confrontation between NK and ROK. WEI WUV scores are, however, useful tools
in investigating the effects of various assumptions on today's conventional valance.
[Ref. 14: pp. 16- IS]
Empirically, numerical superiority, at least in troop strength, is neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition for battlefield victory. Notably, smaller forces won several
times. The wisdom about this balance is recognizing that war outcomes are sensitive to
scores of factors, rather than the handful regularitly discussed. Assessment should con-
sider a vast range of plausible scenarios, where scenario is constructed broadly to mean
a set of assumptions about, for example, political-military context, warning times,
mobilization times, alliances, operational strategies, force effectiveness, sheer quality of
38
leaders and their troops for constant equipment, and even the 'laws' of combat that de-
termine rates of advance and attrition.
Static quantitative analysis is by no means useless, but its utility is limited. The
numeric primary value is that is establishes the basic parameters within which a more
comprehensive assessment of the tank gap in Korean Peninsula can be conducted. In
otherwards, the straightforward accounting of the forces of each side is where analysis
of the conventional balance should begin, not end.17
17 Carl Levin, "Realistically Assessing the Conventional Military Balance in Europe", Beyond
the Bean Count, Second Edition July, 19SS, pp. 5-6.
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IV. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF TANK GAP BETWEEN THE ROK AND
NK
Conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula dominates ROK defense
planning and accounts for the bulk of ROK military spending. Certainly, this balance
should be assessed as rigorously as possible. Although figured out, the numeric and
static assessment of the tank gap between NK and the ROK in the previous chapter does
not account for the progress of fighting or attrition rate on each side.
Since warfare is a dynamic process, however, one in which numerous factors interact
overtime, the prospects for conventional defense cannot accurately be measured by a
mere numeric or static comparison of opposing weapon inventories. In the wartime
situation everything will not uncertain and nobody can tell which part can win. How-
ever, a favorable outcome can be anticipated by using dynamic analysis. Therefore, a
dynamic analysis is essential.
A close account of each side's prebattle forces (for example, tanks) is necessary to
any assessment, but accounting alone is not sufficient in a dynamic situation. Soldiers,
analysts, and students of history have long recognized that military outcomes depend
upon operational factors, such as warning, readiness, geography, tactics, coordination,
logistics, combat technology, and troop skill, none of which can be reflected in the raw
numerical comparisons that seem to dominate the debate, indeed, the static and nu-
meric comparison of peacetime weapon inventories can be dangerously misleading if
taken as authoritative evidence of an inability to achieve national wartime goals: the
assumption that numerical inequality implies military inadequacy can lead to misallo-
cations of resources and to the inflation (or deflation) of enemy capabilities, either of
which could prove destabilizing in crisis and escalator}' in war.
If these errors are to be avoided and reasoned judgements made about the material
adequacy of one's forces, it is critical that one's analytical methods relate inputs (pre-
battle force structures) to outputs (performance in the execution of wartime missions)
in a plausible way, explicitly representing the dominant variables and their interaction
over time. [Ref. 16: p. 1]
This chapter presents Lanchester's model as a dynamic analysis model and examines
the dynamic situation of the tank gap between NK and the ROK. The Lanchester
model will be described in detail and its limitations when applied to measurement of the
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tank gap between XK and the ROK. The Epstein model is also described without
mathematical equations.
A. DYNAMIC MODEL
One of the pioneers in the development of such dynamic methods was Frederik
William Lanchester. Born in 1868, the eclectic English engineer made contributions to
such diverse fields as automotive design, fiscal policy, and before his death in 1946, to
the theory of aerodynamics. His reason for conducting an analysis of military combat
was to explain the principle of concentration of firepower. Using his model one can
study and analyze mathematically the process of combat attrition. Others have subse-
quently expanded and developed Lanchester's equations into what has become known
as Lanchester-Type model of combat. Essentially, a Lanchester-Type model of combat
is a set of differential equations which describe mathematically the interactions of op-
posing combat forces. When this set of equations is solved for force levels as a function
of time, the conditions necessary for one force to win (given a definition of winning, such
as driving the opposing force level to zero) may be obtained.
The usefulness of a Lanchester-Type model is that such a model can give some in-
sight into the over-all dynamics of a combat situation. Using a Lanchester model, one
may learn, for example, which of a set of possible tactics appear to be "better" in a given
situation. "Better" could be thought of in terms of winning a battle in a shorter period
of time, or winning a battle while suffering less casualties. One may also learn why a
particular tactic is successful, by studying the mathematical formulation of the combat
dynamics. Lanchester is best remembered for his equations of war, appropriately
dubbed the Lanchester equations. Lanchester's laws occupy a prominent place in the
study of conventional warfare: they lie at the heart of many models of conventional
combat, they appear to shed light on the quantity versus quality debate, and they pro-
vide a simple paradigm for understanding the dynamics of combat.
1. Lanchester Model
The Lanchester equations have for decades dominated the dynamic assessment
of conventional land balances. Lanchester described the attrition of each side in a two-
sided struggle by means of a system of ordinary differential equations. 18 Begining with
18 He described this in his book Aircraft in Warfare; The Dawn of (he Fourth Arm, Constable
and Co., London, 1916.
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three basic assumptions, he postulated two types of attrition: the linear law and the
square law. The assumptions common to both theories were:
• Two military forces (red and blue) are opposing each other. On each side, every
soldier is armed with the same weapon. The attrition rate at which a single weapon
of one kills units of the other side may not be the same for each side.
• Pvery weapon on each side can take under fire all weapons of the opposing side.
• The attrition rates for each side are known and do not change for the duration of
the engagement.
The original Lanchester's linear law results under the circumstances where each
side is ignorant of the exact location of its opposition but does have knowledge of the
general area occupied (area fire). Furthermore, as units of each side are destroyed, the
survivors distribute their fire uniformly over the area occupied by the surviving oppo-
nents. Lanchester's original square law is applicable in the situation where each unit of
both sides knows the precise location of all surviving units of its enemy, so that as op-
ponents are eliminated, fire is immediately shifted to and uniformly distributed over all
surviving units (aimed fire).
The U.S. Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and analytical directorates within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense employ Lanchester-based models to assess theater
balances and to aid in the selection of weapon systems. Theater-level combat modeling
conducted under contract to the Pentagon is also dominated by Lanchester theory and
its extentions. Unlike static and numerical comparisons, the Lanchester equations rec-
ognize some of warfare's operational dimensions and allow one to estimate such things
as the winner and loser, the daily number of survivors on each side, and the duration of
the war.
Two of Lanchester's results have become known as "laws": the square law and
the linear law. These two laws form the basis for most applications of the Lanchester
equations. Crudely put, the square law states that the measure of combat power is a
force's effectiveness times the square of its numerical size. If two forces are equal by this
measure, then neither side will win. Thus, the square law makes the outcome of combat
more sensitive to force size, the squared term, than effectiveness. It is for this reason
that the law has become so popular in the quantity-quality debate.
Lanchester's linear law is perhaps better known, even though Lanchester hy-
pothesized that it primarily applied to ancient combat and to the case of indirect fire.
Unlike the square law, the linear law gives equal weight to force size and effectiveness.
[Ref. 17: p. 91]
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The literature on original Lanchester's law and equations has been very techni-
cal and mathematical, creating a communications gap between professional modelers,
the consumers of model results, and academic analysts interested in conventional com-
bat modeling. Therefore, this section provides a nonmathematical introduction to
Lanchester's equations based on the exploration of John W. R. Lepingwell published in
International Security, Summer 1987.19
a. The Square Law
Lanchester suggested that it is the nature of modern warfare that the in-
stantaneous casualty rate on each side be proportional to the current numerical strength
of the opposition, provided that the combat situation be such that the numerically su-
perior side is able to bring its full superiority to bear on the opposition. Lanchester was
led to derive the square law by observing that modern weapons allow the concentration
of fire. This observation provides the basic assumptions underlying the square law: fire
is directed, both sides are able to aim and concentrate their fire upon selected targets,
and fire is distributed evenly over targets. Targets must be visible and targetable, and
the consequences of fire must be determinable so that after a target is disabled, fire will
be immediately shifted to a new target. 20 If forces are lined up along a wide front, con-
centration of fire is limited by the range of weapons, but the square law still holds in this
case if both forces are deployed with uniform density along the sector of the front being
modeled. 21
The square law can be easily derived from the above assumptions. Assume
two forces (Red and Blue) facing each other in the open, armed with rifles, able to aim
their fire at each other, and able to shift their fire to a new target when a target is disa-
bled. In a given interval of time, each member of Red's force chooses a target, fires at
it, and has a certain probability of hitting and disabling the target. 22 it will refer to the
19 John W. R. Lepingwell, 'The Laws of Combat Lanchester Reexamined," International
Security, Summer 1987.
20 J^his assumption may seem obvious, but in war the determination of the effects of fire is
often quite difficult.
21 If the forces are lined up with uniform density along the front, one can cut a number of
narrow strips perpendicular to the front, and within each of these strips, concentration of lire should
be possible. See H. K. Weiss. "Lanchcster-Type Models of Warfare, "in M. Davies. R.T. Eddison,
and T. Page, eds., International Conference on Operational Research (Baltimore, Md.: Operations
Research Society of America, 1957). p. 81.
22 There is also an implicit assumption that target acquisition time is small and that targets
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combined probability of hitting and disabling the target as the probability of kill.23
During the time interval, it is assumed that each Red rifleman fires several rounds, and
if he disables his designated target, he shifts his fire to a new one. The rate of fire times
the probability of kill of each shot is the effectiveness of the force.24 Mutiplying the
number of Red riflemen firing by their effectiveness gives the expected number of Blue
riflemen disabled in the time interval. Thus the rate of loss of Blue is the product of the
number of Red riflemen and their effectiveness.
If the number of Red riflemen is doubled, while holding the number of Blue
riflemen constant, Red will be able to fire twice as many bullets at Blue as before; they
can concentrate their fire on the Blue riflemen. Since Red's volume of fire has doubled,
Blue's rate of loss will double.25 If each side is composed of homogeneous forces with
the same type of weapon and vulnerability, and both sides are using directed fire, it can
be obtained the square law by expressing the logic in mathematical form. Using the
notation:
R: number of men on Red's side
r: the effectiveness of Red's fire on Blue
B: number of men on Blue's side
b: the effectiveness of Blue's fire on Red
We may then represent the rate of loss of the forces:
dt
are always available to be fired upon. Thus the rate-determining factors is the rate of fire, rather
than the rate of appearance of targets. If the target acquisition time is inversely proportional to the
number of enemy targets and is the rate-determining factors in the process, then the linear law is
obtained. See Taylor, Lanchester Models of Warfare, Vol. 1, pp. 92,163.
23 The probabilities of hitting and disabling the target are conceptually different, but in
Lanchester's derivation, they are combined into one probability. This probability is referred to as
the probability of kill in keeping with the common usage of the term.
24 Effectiveness is called the attrition-rate coefficient by Taylor. Although the latter term is
more accurate, the term "effectiveness" will be used for consistency with Lanchester.
25 The objection may be raised that there is no reason to believe that this doubling is correct:
the relation between number of shots fired and rate of loss may well be nonlinear. This objection






where dB dt is the rate of change of the Blue force over time, and dR/dt is the rate of
change of the Red force over time. The parameters R and B are refered to as force levels,
since they represent numbers of riflemen, tanks, or other forces. The above equations
state that in a very short period of time, the rate of loss of one force is proportional to
the number and effectiveness of the opposing force. Solving these two equations for the






This equation states that two forces are equal when the products of the square of their
force levels and their effectiveness are equal.26 Equal in this sense means that both forces
will be completely destroyed if the battle is allowed to continue until completion. 27 The
square law indicates that the appropriate measure of a force's military capability is the
force level squared times its effectiveness, which Lanchester termed the fighting strength
of the force. If a force's size is doubled, its fighting strength would be increased by a
factor of four, while if its effectiveness were doubled, the fighting strength would only
double. The square law therefore indicates that the outcome of combat is more sensitive
to changes in numbers than to changes in weapons effectiveness. This is often taken to
mean that weapons quantity counts more than quality, hence the invocation of the
square law in the quantity-quality debate. This square law is much more favorable to
NK than to the ROK. Because. As discussed in Chapter III, NK possess more tanks
26 The above form of the equation is obtained by setting the rate of loss equations equal and
integrating with respect to the two force levels, giving the general solution:
r[R 2([)-R 2 (0)] = b[B\t)-B 2 (0)l
with R(t) and B(t) set to zero.
2" In theory, the combat between equal forces continues for an infinite length of time since
the equations and variables are continuous, but in practice, targets are discrete and the battle will
end at some point. The forms of the Lanchester equations presented here assume that combat will
be continued until the end. Breakpoints can be incorporated into the equations, allowing one to
model forces that do not fight to the finish and that might "break" at different force levels. The
choice of these breakpoints may be critical to the outcome of a model. See Taylor, Lanchester
Models of Warfare, Vol. I, pp. 123-140, 234-368; and Rovert L. Helmbold. Decision in Battle:
Breakpoint Hypotheses and Engagement Termination Dale, R-772-PR (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand
Corporation, 1971).
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than the ROK so the tank gap should be greater even though NK tank's capacity is in-
ferior than U.S.-ROK tanks.
The square law captures an important characteristic of modern warfare in
that it incorporates the advantages of concentration and directed fire. 28 This fits in well
with military thought on the utility of concentration and makes the square law very ap-
pealing for modeling combat. 29 Concentration of fire leads to two important character-
istics of the square law. First, is the differential casualty ratio. This is defined as the
ratio of the loss rate of Blue and Red forces (dB'dR = rR bB) and varies inversely with
the force ratio. Because the larger force can concentrate its fire on the smaller force, if
the larger force adds more numbers, its losses will decline because it can destroy the en-
emy even more rapidly. The more the winning force outnumbers the losing force, the
greater will be the loss rate of the losing force, while the winner's loss rate will stay the
same. The battle will, therefore, last a shorter period of time, and the winner will suffer
fewer casualities.
The behavior of the differential casualty ratio points out the importance of
concentration and supports the military dictum of never divide one's force. As
Lanchester recognized, it is always preferable to outnumber an opponent by as much
as possible and to engage the enemy with the full force simultaneously rather than se-
quentially.
As an example of the above, let us assume an tank troop of 500 giving
battle in turn to two tank troops of 400 and 300 respectively, equally well armed (same
effectiveness); then the strengths are equal since (500) 3 = (400) 2 + (300) 2 . If. on the other
hand, the two smaller tank troops are given time to effect a junction, then the tank troop
of 500 will be overwhelmed, for the fighting strength of the opposing force, 700, is no
longer equal, but is .in fact, nearly twice as great-namely, in the relation of 49 to 25.
28 One difficulty is that the concentration is unlimited, and the effects of range limitations or
force-to-space ratios are not taken into consideration in simple Lanchester models. The latter,
however, may be specified externally to the model. For a discussion of force-to-space ratios, see
John J. Mearsheimer. Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell L'niversitv Press, 19S3), es-
pecially PP. 44, IS 1-183.
29 Lanchester believed that the effects of concentration would be most marked in air combat,
where forces could concentrate their fire on each other in three dimensions, rather than just two.
See Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare, pp. 51, 138-139; and Lanchester. "Mathematics in Warfare,"
p. 2147.
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Thus, there is a distinct advantage in concentrating forces because the
square of the sum will be greater than the sum of the squares of the component forces.
The basic square law equations may be solved so as to give an equation for
the attrition of the forces over time, the time to the end of the conflict, and the force
level left for the victor. This set of equations forms the basis for simple square law
models. 30 The Lanchester equations do not, in their basic form, provide for movement
of the front. Movement of forces must either be specified separately or incorporated
into an extended form of the basic Lanchester equations. 31 [Ref. 17: pp. 93-97]
When this square law is applied to the number of tanks on the Korean
Peninsula, the tank gap should be greater than the numerical assessment. As discussed
in Chapter III, NK has 3,450 tanks and the ROK has 1,500 tanks, and the USA has 150
M60A3 tanks. To measured the tank gap, the fighting strength of each tank might be
calculated. Even though the number of tanks of both NK and ROK is known the ef-
fectiveness coefficient of each tank must be obtained from other sources. This is largely
an empirical question and is beyond the scope of this thesis Therefore, the effectiveness
coefficient will be ignored and it is assumed that each tank's coefficient is the same.
Now the tank gap ratio is calculated as the square the each country's tanks. Thus the
tank gap ratio is 5.29:1 (3,4502/l,500: ). When U.S. tanks are added to ROKs number
of tanks, the ratio is reduced to 4.37:1 ( 3,450-/1650-'). This result is established by fo-
cusing on the number of tanks only. It should be further reduced because as mentioned
in Chapter III the U.S.-ROK has a higher tank capability than NK. in areas such as
nightfighting ability, automatic range-finder, computerized fire control and shoot when
moving. Since the effectiveness coefficient is calculated by rate of fire times probability
of kill of each shot, the coefficient of the U.S.-ROK should be much higher than NK.
A more important consideration is that the real dynamic situation of war-
fare is the combination of weapons not only tanks. At present NK has more aircraft
than ROK, but there is almost no gap between the two countries close air support
(CAS). When the U.S. CAS ability is added to the ROK NK's superiority in tanks does
not exist any more Because the U.S. strategists contend that reinforcements of U.S. air
power would give ROK and American air forces the ability to provide immediate sup-
30 The square law is itself deterministic, since it is a differential equation, but a probability of
winning the battle may be obtained from a stochastic analog of the square law.
31 See Weiss. "Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare," pp. 84-89, for an example of an extension
of the basic square law that incorporates movement.
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port to ROK ground forces, especially against XK armor. They would still meet the
requirements of air defense, establishing air superiority over the battlefields, and pene-
tration air strikes north of the DMZ. In addition, B-52s special capabilities (demon-
strated in Vietnam), would be employed against massed formations of NK tanks. Thus
the location of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula is essential for maintaining peace
on the Korean Peninsula.
b. Linear Law
After presenting his "square law" as a model of combat in which the nu-
merically superior side is able to bring that superiority to bear on the opposition,
Lanchester turned to the description of combat that occurs in the sense of one-on-one
engagements, so that the numerically superior side has an advantage only in having
more eligible combatants. Lanchester's linear law drops the assumption of concen-
tration of fire. Lanchester originally derived the linear law by considering ancient
short-range weapons: soldiers equipped with weapons, such as swords, could find little
advantage in concentration because several soldiers could not simultaneously attack an
opponent. Ten men with swords fighting one man would have to fight him sequentially,
as they could not all get close enough to engage him simutaneously. Under more mod-
ern conditions, the linear law may hold in artillery duels using indirect fire.
In the case of indirect fire, both sides are engaging in fire that is not directed
against any one target but is evenly distributed throughout a given area. Firers do not
have information on the effects of fire and do not shift fire to a new target when a target
is disabled. Targets are "overkilled," and indirect fire is, therefore, less efficient than di-
rect fire. This lack of retargeting means that fire is not concentrated as it is direct fire.
Artillery duels provide a good example of indirect fire. The rate of loss of
Blue forces under fire will depend not only on the number of Red guns firing and Red's
effectiveness, but also on the size of Blue's forces in the area under fire.32 This can be
seen by imaging a group of Blue artillery units destributed uniformly over an area and
then subjecting the area to bombardment. If a constant amount of bombardment is
assumed, then the more artillery units in the area, the more losses they will sustain per
32 Effectiveness in this context is a different quantity than in the square law. although it is
conceptually similar . In this case, the effectiveness is the number of expected casualties per target
and per fixer in a unit of time, whereas the square law effectiveness has units of expected casualties
per firer in a unit of time. These two types of effectiveness are similar but are not directly inter-
changeable.
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unit time.33 Thus, the rate ofloss is similar to that of the square law, with the addition
of a term for the size of the force under attack. If homogeneous forces are assumed with









Integrating the above equations gives the linear law equality condition:
rR{0) = bB(0)
As with the square law, a series of equations may be derived that give in-
formation on attrition over time. 34 The linear law differs from the square law in several
important respects. First, it does not give any special advantage to force level. The
force level is not squared and counts for as much as effectiveness. Second, concentration
of forces has no effect on reducing the winner's total casualties. Since both side's force
level appears in the loss rate, adding more forces increases the number of targets in the
area for the enemy to kill, as well as increasing the enemy's own loss rate. The battle
may end sooner, but the winner will still lose the same number of troops. This is re-
flected in the fact that the differential casualty ratio for the linear law (dB dR = r/b)
does not depend on the force levels of the two forces.
Because the linear law does not exhibit the effects of concentration, it has
been relatively neglected. The question of concentration should not lead to rejecting the
linear law outright. Amassing forces to create local superiority in fighting strength is still
feasible under the linear law and is necessary to success. The difference is that concen-
trating past the point where one wins is to no avail, whereas in the case of the square
law, it helps to reduce the winner's casualties. [Ref. 17: pp. 100-103]
33 One set of conditions using indirect fire results in the square law. If indirect fire, such as
artillery fire, is maintained on an area that shrinks as targets are disabled so that a constant density
of targets is maintained, we again obtain the square law. This is the case of a constant-density en-
gagement. If the area is subjected to indirect fire, and the defense maintains a constant area, then
the defenders should be attrited in accordance with the linear law.
34 Since the losing side's force level asymptotically approaches zero, it is not possible to give
equations for the time to end of combat unless a fixed breakpoint is assumed. See Taylor,
Lanchesier Models of Warfare, pp. 91-102. 134-140.
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When the linear law is applied to measuring the tank gap on the Korean
Peninsula, it calculates a more favorable advantage to the ROK when compared to
square law results. Since the effectiveness coefficient (r, b) is ignored, the linear law re-
sults are equal to the numerical comparison results in measuring the tank gap between
NK and ROK; as discussed in Chapter III the ratio is 2.3:1. Using the linear law results
in measuring the tank gap, the ratio should be reduced at a certain point primarily be-
cause the U.S.-ROK's tanks have a higher capability than NX's tanks in fighting
strength. As mentioned before the real dynamic situation of warfare causes the
U.S.-ROK to have a higher capability than NK in military strength. The U.S.-ROK has
a firepower plan with three elements to counter an initial NK attack: (1) tactical air
support from fighters and fighter bombers based in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and
with the Seventh Fleet; (2) artillery and anti-armor assets with ROK and U.S. ground
units; and (3) massive air strikes from B-52 bombers based on Guam. [Ref. 2: p. 271]
So the initial attrition rate of NK's tank should be high and it will be reduced the tank
gap between NK and ROK significantly.
c. Critiques of Lanchester's Theory
Although dynamic models attempt to quantify and take into account many
aspects of war that the static balance comparisons do not, they must necessarily rely on
many assumptions concerning the conditions under which a war would be fought. Some
of these conditions cannot be predicted, thus placing the credibility of such models'
outcomes in question. Questions also arise concerning the equations used in the models,
whether the model, or the scenario, is biased for or against a particular side, and the
sensitivity of the model to different assumptions. Thus it would appear that a dynamic
model may have as many disadvantages as advantages and does not necessarily offer a
more reliable method for evaluating relative combat capability than some less sophisti-
cated static models. Unfortunately, though directed at the right questions, the
Lanchester equations offer a fundamentally implausible representation of combat under
all but a very small set of circumstances. Lanchester theory suffers at least three serious
problems. 35
35 This study is. of course, concerned specifically with problems beyond those encountered
by all models (for example, the need to aggregate; to estimate effectiveness coefficients and other
numbers: to idealize and simplify). A number of the aggregation and other problems that all models
face are d^cussed in J.A. Stockfish. Models, Data, and liar: A Critique of the Study of Comen-
lional Forces, R-1526-PR, prepared for the U.S. Air Force Project Rand (Santa Monica. Calif.:
Rand Corp., 1975).
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( 1 ) No Consideration of Withdrawal. A plausible model of ground war
should capture the basic connection between attrition and the movement of the battle
front. Historically, the basic rationale for withdrawal has been to reduce one's attrition;
if a defender's attrition exceeds a certain threshold, he may withdraw, an action which
reduces his attrition. Not one of the Lanchester models (for example, square law or
linear law) reflects this essential feedback, nor is it mathematically possible for them to.
Not one of these equations can capture the effect of withdrawal -a response to attrition-
on the rate of attrition itself.
This is evident from Lanchester's attrition equations themselves.
When solved for the opposing Red and Blue forces surviving at any time, /, the
Lanchester square differential equations yield the following formulas:
R{t) = y CWO) - Vt Bif))}^ 1 + {R(0) + Vy5(0)}r J* ']
and
B(t) = ! [{B(Q) - V -f R(0)}^ [ + W) + Vt R^ e~ vV* ']
R(t) and B(t) are the Red and Blue forces at time /, while r and b (real numbers between
zero and one) are their respective Lanchester effectiveness coefficients. Clealy, R(t) and
B(t) depend only on r, b, t (time), and the initial Red and Blue forces. The rate of
withdrawal does not appear; thus withdrawal does not affect the rate of attrition. The
same is true for all other forms of the Lanchester equations.
The ROK-U.S. defense strategy is governed by the forward defense
concept. Forward defense requires that a NK invasion be halted and turned back north
of Seoul by the ROK divisions and one U.S. division reinforced by U.S. and ROK air
power. But when NK break the peace on the Korean Peninsula again, NK will use every
weapon they can during the initial attack. At the initial time of war, ROK's attrition
rate will be high. Therefore, the ROK government have prepared a plan to withdraw
their troops at certain position to reduce the initial losses and prepare for counter-attack
to NK. Therefore, withdrawal should be considered in real warfare. Withdrawal can
also be used as a tactics to prepare for aneffective counter-attack and reduce unneces-
sary losses.
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(2) No Consideration about Trading of Space for Time.. Because there
is no feedback from withdrawal rates to attrition rates, the Lanchester expression for the
duration of the war (that is, the time elapsed) gives exactly the same answer whether the
defender withdraws a thousand miles or does not withdraw at all. The Lanchester du-
ration (time) is totally independent of the amount or rate of withdrawal (space) and of
the functional form chosen to calculate the velocity of the front. This, is easily demon-
strated.
Letting tmd stand for the time (in days) required by Red to annihilate
Blue, the square law duration will illustrate the general point. There are various ways
to write the duration; one is:
^ g7f¥ r-r- =^") 2Jfb 7*o' -75o*
Here again tend obviously depends only on r, b, and the initial Red and Blue forces. The
duration of the war, tmd< is totally independent of the amount or rate of withdrawal. The
same is true of the duration formulas derived from other forms of the Lanchester dif-
ferential equations. In short, the Lanchester equations are incapable of representing
perhaps the most fundamental tactic in military history: trading space for time. Given
Blue and Red forces and effectiveness ratings, how much longer does the war last if one
adopts this movement function as against that movement function? The Lanchester
equations are incapable of answering the question.
The ROK has established strong points along the invasion routes.
These fortifications are intended to create bottlenecks along the relatively narrow inva-
sion routes where anti-tank weapons, artillery, and air strikes would pour fire into NK
troops and armor. So, when XK breaks peace on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK has
a plan to withdraw at certain position between DMZ and Seoul, (for example,
FEBA-ALPHA line) Then, the ROK will earn some time for preparing a counter-attack.
In addition, the civilian economic production system can be transformed to support
military strength. Since ROK s economic power is greater than \K's economic power,
it is plausible that the ROK can overcome the initial disadvantage and can effectively
defend itself from NK's invasion.
f3 j No Consideration about Diminishing Marginal Returns. This point
concerns the most famous and widely used result of Lanchester theory, the square law.
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Given Red and Blue forces. Lanchester states this famous square stalemate condition
as follows: "the fighting strengths of the two forces are equal when the square of the
numerical strength multiplied by the fighting value of the individual units are equal." M> What
he called fighting values are simply the Lanchester coefficients, b and r. Thus, in modern
notation the square law says that a Blue force, B(0), will stalemate a Red force, R(0),
only if:
bB(0) 2 = rR(Q) 2 .
Equivalently, the effectiveness ratio, b/r, must equal the square of the numerical ratio,
R(0) B(0), for Blue to stalemate Red. So, for example, to stalemate an adversary three
times one's size (in lethality units), it does not suffice to be three times as effective (per
unit), or even six, seven, or eight times. Rather, one must be fully nine times as effective.
There simply is no convincing evidence of this; indeed, there is impressive evidence to the
contrary. 3" As noted below, one of the necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for
any of the Lanchester equations to hold is that no movement (that is, defensive with-
draw) of the front be possible (since movement would have some effect on attrition rates,
a feedback precluded in the Lanchester equations). What sorts of military engagements
would qualify? Assaults on small, defended islands, for example.
An island roughly five miles long, where the defender was basically
surrounded, and where movement of the front was all but impossible is among the spe-
cial cases to which Lanchester equations may apply. It is the only case in which there
is any statistical correspondence between events as they unfolded and as hypothesized
by the Lanchester equations. Even if the statistical fit were good, there would be no
basis for extrapolation to cases where movement is possible (for example, Korean Pen-
insula) And. in fact, the fit is not good.
History's refusal to conform is not surprising when one notices that,
at bottom, the Lanchester square equations deny a phenomenon to which virtually all
3b Lanchester. Aircraft in Warfare, p. 48. Lanchester's emphasis. A stalemate is, of course, a
fight to the finish in which both sides are drawn to zero.
37 By the same arithmetic, acceptance of the square law forces one to interpret given outcomes
in questionable ways. lor example, if one side stalemates (fights to zero-zero) an adversary five
times as numerous the Lanchesterite is mathematically compelled to conclude that the smaller force
was twenty-five times as effective (that is, if stalemate occurred, then the effectiveness ratio equaled
the square of the numerical ratio).
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social processes - including war- are subject: the phenomenon is diminishing marginal
returns. To see this, a brief derivation is necessary.






from which the famous square law is obtained directly by integration. 38 Let us take a
closer look at equation (dR/dB = bB rR), which implies the square law.39 It asserts that
the instantaneous casualty - exchange ratio, dR/dB - the limiting ratio of Reds killed per
Blue killed - is a linear function of the force ratio, B R.
Thus the casualty-exchange rate. dR'dB, grows at a constant - never
marginally diminishing - rate, b r, as the force ratio, BR grows. No crowding, no
force-to-space constraint, ever sets in to moderate the "concentratability" of Blue's force.
This is highly implausible: it is the essence of the Lanchester square law.
Some forms of the Lanchester differential equations do not imply a
square relation (for example, the linear law), while others, allow for asymmetrical sol-
utions in which one side enjoys a square effect and the other does not (the so-called
ambush variant). -W Where (a) no diminishing marginal re' turns' set in (for example, no
force-to- space constraints apply) and (b) where movement of the front is precluded.









Setting R(t) = B(t) = 0, the familiar stalemate condition, or .V2 law, follows:






r [ B{0) '
As noted above, the effectiveness ratio, br. must equal the square of the numerical ratio, R B, to
stalemate.
39 In fact, the above equation both implies and is entailed by the Lanchester square state
equation given in the above note; hence the two are equivalent.
40 This may well be the most plausible of all Lanchester variants, when applied to guerrilla
engagements. See S.J.Deitchman, "A I anchester Model of Guerrilla Warfare," Operations Re-
search, vol. 10 (Novemember - December 1962), pp. 818-27; and Taylor, Lanchester Models of
War/are, vol. 1, pp. 169-81.
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certain forms may be more or less appealing. But as noted above, no form of the
Lanchester equations registers, or can register, the effect of withdrawal (a response to
attrition) on the rate of attrition itself. For that reason, they suffer the serious problems
set forth at the outset. [Ref. 16: pp. 4-13]
In terms of Lanchester's law, ROK has apparently little chance of
winning because at present the ROK s military strength is less than NK's. Even though
ROK weapon's capability is better than XK's, according to the Lanchester law the ROK
cannot overcome the tank gap. Therefore, when Lanchester model is applied on the
Korean Peninsula, it should consider the diminishing marginal returns.
Given the qualitative differences, outlined in Chapter III, it is clear
that a realistic assessment of the relative combat potential of the tank fleets of the ROK
and NK must take into account both quantity and quality. Assessment of quality is
bound to be more subjective than a bean count of number of tanks in service. The
starting point for estimating the balance of combat potential is the number of tanks
facing each other in the main area of operations.
Historic experience of tank warfare between countries equipped with
Western (include U.S) and Soviet tanks respectively suggests that an exchange ratio of
2:1 or more in the Western (U.S.) tanks favor is possible. 41 Many analysts believe that
NATO (U.S.) will enjoy an even more favorable exchange ratio -up to 6:1- because they
assume that NATO will have the advantage of being on the defensive. This assumption
is the same on the Korean Peninsula. ROK-U.S. tank's inferiority in number of tanks
will not impact seriously on the real dynamic situation even though the exchange rate
is not 6:1, as in Europe.
According to a recent report, arms buyers can expect to pay at least
three times as much on the world market for an M60A3 or a Leopard 1 as for a T-55.42
This large price differential reinforces the contention that older U.S. (Western) models
are of considerably greater combat value than their Soviet counterparts. Thus, the tank
gap between NK and ROK is not as significant a problem in a dynamic situation.
41 Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance," pp. 80-81.
42 Ian Curtis. 'Tankionics: New Subsystems for Armor," p. 17; and "Standard Arms Prices.'
Defense and Foreign Affairs, Vol. XVI, No.2 (1988), p. 47.
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2. Epstein Model
For decades Lanchester equations dominated dynamic analysis, but
Lanchester's equations fail to capture warfare's basic dynamics and present a funda-
mentally misleading picture of war. Joshua M. Epstein contends this in his study.43 He
then presents new, alternative equations of his own. These, he contends, more accurately
represent the core dynamics to which Lanchester theory is oblivious. Besides being of
theoretical interest, Epstein's methods have immediate practical relevance in such
pressing policy areas as force planning and defense budgeting. This section introduces
a brief description of the Epstein's dynamic model without any mathematical equation
form.
The attacker makes an opening "bid" on the pace of war, the rate at which his
own forces are consumed (he can, of course, set his rate at zero by not attacking). He
may want to press the attack at an extremely high pace, and be willing to suffer ex-
tremely high attrition rates, if -for operational, strategic, or political reasons- a quick
decision is paramount. A casualty-exchange ratio (defenders killed per attacker killed)
imposes an attrition rate on the defender. The latter may elect to hold his position and
accept this attacker-dictated rate, or he may choose to redece his (and in turn the
attacker's) attrition rate by withdrawing at a certain speed.
Operational, strategic, or political factors may preclude a defender's trading
space for time. However, given its tactical advantages, so eloquently described by
Clausewitz, a plausible model should permit it.44
The adaptive model of war offered by Epstein does so and also yields a more
realistic picture o[ movement on the ground. Rather than the smooth velocity curves
generated by traditional (no feedback) methods, these equations generate a jagged se-
quence of velocities reflecting the alternation of action and inaction so characteristic of
real war. [Ref. 16 : pi 4]
Epstein's model, which attempts to simulate the conduct of a conventional war
of attrition, is based on the premise that both the attacker and defender will accept some
level of attrition to their forces in an effort to attain some objective. For the attacker,
the objective might be to gain territory, and the defender's goal might be to repel the
43 Joshua M. Epstein, The Calculus of Comenlional War: Dynamic Analysis without
Lanchester Theory, Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution, 1985.
44 Carl von Clausewitz, "Retreat to the Interior of the Country," On War, ed. and trans.
Michael Howard and Peter Parei (Princeton University Press. 1976). bk. 6, chap. 25, pp. 469-79.
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attacker without losing ground. Epstein has assumed, however, that there is some level
of attrition beyond which each side is willing to abandon its objective, at least tempo-
rarily; that is, when losses become too high, the aggressor might stop pressing the attack.
Likewise, the defender might be willing to withdraw to a new position to avoid further
losses, at least for the moment.
Epstein attempts to capture these phenomena through mathematical equations
describing each side's starting position and losses for each day of a theoretical war.
When hostilities begin, each side's total forces can be assigned a numeric value, such as
the weapon effectiveness index/weighted unit value (WEI/WUV) score described in
Chapter III. In addition, each side might start out with a specific number of ground-
attack aircraft with which it can inflict losses on the other side's ground forces. As the
war progresses, each side loses ground combat capability and aircraft as determined by
the equations Epstein has developed. The defense, in order to maintain its losses at an
acceptable level, gives up ground. The mathematical process of removing ground and
air assets can continue for a specified number of days or until one side is decimated.
Epstein's dynamic model also has limitations. Epstein's model, like any quan-
titative method for evaluating the relationship between two military forces, cannot be
used to predict the outcome of an actual conflict. No mathematical model, even one
that attempts to capture the dynamics of warfare, can replicate all the factors that de-
termine the course o[ a battle. Indeed, some factors that have a large impact on the
outcome of a conflict -such as leadership, morale, and tactical competence- that cannot
be quantified. Others, such as location of the attack, weather and other conditions at
the time of attack, and the element of surprise cannot be predicted. [Ref. 14: p. 77]
When measure the dynamic situation of warfare on the Korean Peninsula of the
whole ground forces and CAS capability, the Epstein model is more applicable than the
Lanchester model.
B. ADVANTAGE OF DYNAMIC MODELS
Dynamic comparisons take into account each side's ability to destroy the other and
the effect of attrition over time. Such models, however, require much of the same
quantitative information included in static balanced and more. Dynamic comparisons
can be viewed as starting where static comparisons end. In addition to counting each
side's equipment, dynamic models also simulate the destruction of the opposing's
weapons, depending on the ability of each side's systems to do so. Thus, the ability of
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each combatant's weapons to find and destroy the enemy's weapons and the rate at
which this can be done determine the outcome of a force comparison. In this way, dy-
namic models can, based on numerous assumptions and inputs, simulate the interaction
of many different types of weapons, the impact of different strategies, and the contrib-
ution of logistic support.
Calculation of dynamic balance, however, requires many detailed inputs; many as-
sumptions about the interactions of individual governing it; judgments concerning the
behavior of commanders on each side; and, generally, large computers to process the
numbers. Furthermore, since dynamic assessments of force balance depend on the
conduct of war, they are highly dependent on local force concentration. Finally, the
outputs of such models typically describe the amount of territory a military unit has
ceded to its attacker after so many days of war, or the number of enemy tanks and air-
craft destroyed by each side. [Ref. 14: pp. 81-83]
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V. CONCLUSION
The NK's superiority in tanks on Korean Peninsula has usually been overstated.
Even though the numerical advantage is 2.3:1, the superior quality of U.S.-ROK tanks
largely offsets even this modest lead, and may even mean that the U.S.-ROK tank force
has greater combat potential. As mentioned in chapter III most U.S.-ROK tanks have
considerable advantages in their capabilities for observation, firepower, tactical mobility,
and armor protection. The uncertainty is in determining how big an allowance to make
in translating the U.S.-ROK quality advantage into combat potential.
According to a ROK government pronouncement, the ROK's conventional military
strength is only 66 percent that of NK. When the U.S. forces located in ROK, are added
in. the combined force is only 72 percent that of NK. This percentage is improved,
compared to the last year's 65 percent (70 percent when U.S. troops were added), but it
is probably not enough. Therefore, it is recommended that the ROK government should
continuously invest 5 percent of the ROK's GXP to improve it's military strength.
Military balance with NK can only be achieved through this investment.45 Since the
ROK's economic power is greater than that of NK and the ROK's military spending is
greater than NK since 1985, the military strength gap (including the tank gap) will be
reduced continuously. So, the location of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula is es-
sential until the ROK can provide it's own self-defense capability. Before considering
the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula, the role of the U.S.
troopsshould be carefully studied and understood. U.S. troops provide the deterrent that
prevents another war on the Korean Peninsula and contributes to maintaining the peace
in Far Eastern Asia. Therefore, the U.S. troops role should not be underestimated.
The ROK government does not anticipate having U.S. troops in the ROK forever.
Nor, it seems,does the U.S. anticipate having troops in the ROK forever due to the
limited budget for U.S. military support. Therefore, when the U.S. government reduces
or withdraws all of the U.S. troops from the ROK, it should be done only when the
military balance between NK and the ROK is established. Also, U.S. troop withdrawal
should not occur until the conventional military balance between the Eastern and
Western blocs in the Far Eastern Asia is acheived.
45 The Korea Central Daily (Korean Version), Oct. 26 1986.
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ROK armed forces ought to work toward a more autonomous and multifaceted ca-
pability and must continue to strengthen forward defense assets, especially the hardening
of antitank gun positions. Existing programs such as the procurement of TOW anti-
tank missiles and Hughes anti-tank helicopters should continue. The ROK air force
appearently has begun a trend toward orienting more of its fighters to a ground support,
anti-tank role and hopefully, this trend will continue. A longer conflict with limited
outside reinforcement would require a more mobile ROK army for purposes of elastic
defense and counter-offensive operations. Steps to enhance these capabilities could re-
quire a 50 to 100 percent increase in the number of tanks in order to form two to three
armored or additional mechanized divisions as a strategic reserve. [Ref. 2: p. 275] The
ROK reportedly wants to build at least 700 K-l MBTs. Building these K-l MBTs would
contribute significantly to reducing the tank gap between NK and ROK.
The ROK government also should weigh the possible Soviet and NK reaction.
Soviet policy toward to the ROK remains unfriendly and there is little prospect for im-
provement. If the USSR continues its military buildup in the Northwest Pacific and
does not establish friendly contacts with the ROK, the ROK then would be justified in
changing its defense policies by the early 1990s to take into account the Soviet threat.
Moreover, if the Soviets gain further strategic access to NK and expand the supply of





APPENDIX A. ARMS TRANSFERS TO NORTH KOREA 1950-1987
Date Sup- Date













































15 Yak-17 UTI 1953
15 MIG-15 UTI 1953
















































































3 MIG-21 UTI 1965
5 AN-24 1965-66
100 Su-100 1965-66
250 BTR 152 1965-71
250 BTR 40 1965-71
150 PT-7 6 1966-68
21 MIG-21 1966
360 SA-2 SAM 1966
20 MI -4 1966
70 T-54/55 1967
2 Submarine "W" Class 1967






4 Patrol Boat"Shan. "1967
18 Torpedo Boat p4 1967
4 Gun Boat "TG" Type 1968
65 MIG-21 1968-71
390 K-13 "Atoll" &AM 1968-71
250 T-54/55 Tanks 1968-70
28 SU-7 FGA 1971
40 "FROG-5" SSM 1971
3 "Samlet" SSM 1971
132 "Styx" ShShm 1971-72 To arm 8 "OSA"








200 SA-7 SA Missi le 1972-73
20 Frog 7 Arty R Dcket 1972-73
50 T-55 Tanks 1972-73




























1975 SS-N-2 "Styx" ShShM 1975 To arm new
missile boats
Fast Patrol Boats 1975
50 T-62 Tanks 1975
China 3 Submarine "Romeo-L" 1975
1976 China 2 Submarine "Romeo--L" 1976
1978 MIG-23?
1982 China 20 F-6 Fighter 1982
1983 20 MIG-21F 1983
1984 30 MIG-23 1984 Fighter
26 MIG-23 1985 Fighter
24 MIG-23 1986 Intercepter
90 AA-7Apex 1985 Reportedly








15 Ml-24Hind-D 1985 Unconfirmed
30 Ml-24Hind-D 1986-87
24 Ml-8Hip 1986 Helicopter
1987 3 Su-25 Frogfoot 1988
Supplier* is the Soviet Union unless indicated in this column. More often than
not, "date ordered" and "number ordere" are not available. Information on arms
transfers to North Korea is sketchy and difficult to obtain.







SIPRI Yearbook 1986, p.
p- 137 SIPRI Yearbook 1973, P- 333;
p- 274 SIPRI Yearbook 1975, P- 232;
p. 266 SIPRI Yearbook 1977, P- 324;
p. 268 SIPRI Yearbook 1979, P- 278;
p- 171 SIPRI Yearbook 1981, P- 255;
p- 251 SIPRI Yearbook 1983, P- 348;
p- 245 SIPRI Yearbook 1985, P- 403;
- 386 SIPRI Yearbook 1987, P- 254;
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SIPRI Yearbook 1988, p. 235;
Arms Trade Registers. The Arms Trade with the Third World, SIPRI 1975, pp. 10
-12; FEER Asia Yearbook 1980, pp. 48,211; "Home Made Romeos," Aviation and Marin
e, Jan 1977, p. 29; (1950-1979 data extracted from: "Arms Transfers and Securit;
istance to the Korean Peninsula 1945-1980: Impact and Implementation," Thesis
by Richard P. Cassiby, Jun 1980, USNPG, Monterey, CA.
)
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APPENDIX B. ARMS TRANSFERS TO REPUBLIC OF KOREA 1950-1987
Date Sup-












75 NA F-51 Mustang 1950-52
15 Piper L-4 1950-52
15 Douglas C-47 1950-52
20 Curtiss C-460 1950-53
2 Frigate, "Tacoma" Class 1950
1 Patrol Boat "PC" 1950
100 M- Sherman Tanks 1950-51
50 M-5 Stuart 1950-51
50 M-24 Chaffee 1950-53
70 M-10 1950-53
200 M-8 Greyhound 1950-59
500 M47/48 Patton Tank 1951-56
2 Frigate, "Tacoma" Class 1951
4 Patrol Boat "PC" 1951
4 Patrol Boat "PCS" 1952
4 Mortar Torpedo Boat 1952
1 Frigate. "Tacoma" Class 1953 Replacement
2 Oiler 1953
70 M-36 1954-60
3 Aero Cdr 520 Aircraft 1954
5 NA F-86F Sabre 1955
1 Oiler 1955 On Loan
2 Tank Landing Ship
Escoat "PCE Ships
1955
2 1966 On Loan
6 Supply Ship 1955-57
2 Escoat "PCD" Ships 1956




9 Medium Landing Ship 1956
3 Coastal Minesweepers 1956

















Order plier'' Quan Item
Date
Del'd Remarks
1958 30 NA F-86F Sabre
3 Tank. Landing Ship
12 Honest Jone SSM




















1 Rocket Landing Ship
2 Patrol Boat "PC"
1 Landing Craft Repair
Ship













































Patrol Boat "PC" 1964
Cessna 185 Skywagon 1964
Cessna 0-1E Birddog 1965
F-5A Freedom Fighter 1965-66
HAWK SAM 1965
Curtiss C-46D 1965-66 MAP
105mm Howitzer 1965-•66





































Curtiss C-46 1967-68 MAP
Cessna 0-1A Birddog 1967-68 MAP
Escoat Transport 1967 2 Transferred
under MAP
Escort "Auk" Class 1967
F-5B Freedom Fighters 1968 MAP
F-5A Freedom Fighters 1968
Coastal Minesweeper 1968 MAP
Coastal Minesweeper 1970 MAP





F-4E Phantom 1969 $52m - ROK
$48m - US MAP








F-5s sent to Viet-
nam, leased until
19 76, Bought for
$46. 5m
F-4D Phantom 1972
Gurmman S-2 Tracker 1971
Honest John SSM 1971
Bell 212 Twin Pac 1971
203mm Howitzers 1971 MAP
M-113A APC 1971 MAP
M-60 Tanks 1971 Trans f/US 7th Div
M107 Howitzer 1971











Order plier'; Quan Item
Date
Del'd Remarks















3 Fast Patrol Boats PSMM
Britain 2 HS 748 Transports
4 Coastal Patrol
"Tarcoma" Class















































"Gearing" CI Destroyers 1977
(2 ea)



















Order plier* Quan Item
Date
Del'd Remarks





24 Rockwell 0V-10G 1977
Bronco Observ. Helicopter
200 Hughes AGM-65A 1977-78
Maverick ASM (150 ea)
1152 Hughes TOW ATM 1977 -78




? Lance SSM 1977
12 Cessna A-37A COIN/
Trainer
1977
10 Bell AH-1J Heli Gunship 1977
10 Fairchild C-123 Transp-
ort
1977
100 Hughes -500M Defender
Hel Missile
1977-•30
45 Nike Hercules SAM 1977
341 AIM-7E 1979
45 Bell UH-1H Cobra Heli.
20 Bell UH-18 Heli. 1977
100 Laser Guided Bomb Kits 1977
6 Lockheed C-130H Hercules
Transports
18 F-4E Phantom Fighter
24 Honest John SSM 1978-79
15 M-88 Al Tank Recovery 1978
Vehicle
MIM-23B Hawk SAM 1978
? MM-38 Exocet ShShM
72 A-10A Fighter 1978-2
? M-48A3 Tanks
6 CH-47C Chinook Heli.
2208 Hughes BGM-71A-1
Air-to-Surface TOW ATM
4 Patrol Ship "Asheville:
37 M-109A2 SP Howitzer
1 Patrol Boat "Grasp" 1978
$50m for Total of
100; 66 License
Produced by S. K.
,
4 Del in ' 76 w/o
arms; arms: TOWATM
$58. 2m; partof







New Const. ; 4
more buile under



























































































21 Model 208 AH-1S



























1968/69, p. 236; SIPRI Yearbook 1969/70, p. 349;
1972, pp. 138-39; SIPRI Yearbook 1973, pp. 334-35;
1974, p. 274; SIPRI Yearbook 1975, p. 232;
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SIPRI Yearbook 1976, p. 266; SIPRI Yearbook 1977, pp. 324-25;











SIPRI Yearbook 1981, p. 256
SIPRI Yearbook 1983, p. 251
SIPRI Yearbook 1985, p. 403
SIPRI Yearbook 1987, p. 254
"Foreign Military Markets," Defense Marketing Services (DMS) (Greenwich: DMS, 1
976) South America/Australasia (South Korea); "Foreign Military Markets," (1950
-1979 data extracted from: "Arms Transfer and Security Assistance to the Korean
Peninsula, 1945-1980: Impact and Implecation," Thesis by Richard P. Cassiby. US
NPG, Monterey, CA, June 1980.
)
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APPENDIX C. TANK TYPES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
TABLE 6. ROK-U. S. TANK TYPES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS







Length, gun forwards (m)
Length, gun in lock (m)
Length of hull over tracks (m)
Width, with skirt plates (m)
Height to top of cupola/sight (m)
Height to turret roof (ra)
Ground clearance (cm)
Width of track
Length of track on ground (m)
Firing height (M)
Max. road speed (km/h)
Max. cross-country speed (km/h)
Cruising speed, road (km/h)
Road range (km)
Fuel capacity (litres)





Fording, with preparation (m)
Fording, w/out preparation (m)
Type
Heater

























1.25 0. 91 0. 91







Main armament calibre (mm)
Type








APFSDS, APDS-T HVAP-PS, HEAT, APFSD, APD
APERS-T, HEAT, HE-P, HE, WP, S-T, APERS






TANK MODEL Ml* M48A3 M60A3
Coaxial armament
Type MG MG MG
Calibre (mm) 7.62 7.62 7.62
Rate of fire (rounds/min) 650-900 650-900
No. of rounds stowed 10,000 6,000 6,000
Anti-aircraft armament
Type MG MG M2 MG M85
Calibre (mm) 12. 7 12. 7 12. 7
Rate of fire (rounds/min) 450-550 1,050
No. of rounds stowed 1,000 630 900
Secondary armament
Type MG
Calibre (mm) 7. 62
Rate of fire (rounds/min) 650-900
No. of rounds stowed 1,400
SIGHTS AND FIRE-CONTROL SYSTEM
Turret drive
By cdr/gnr
Max. traverse rate (o/s) >










Field of view (mils)
Gunner's auxiliary sight
Magnification
Field of view (mils)
Commander's primary sight
Magnification
Field of view (mils)
Gunner's night sight
Magnification
Field of view (mils)
Driver's night sight/type
Magnification






















ext. of GPS in rangefined er













Engine type (No. of cylinders/
arrangement)
Fuel
Max. power output (kw/hp: rpm)
Transmission designation
Type




Suspension and running gear
Type of suspension
Bump travel (mm)
No. of shock absorbers per side
No. of roadwheels per side
No. of top rollers per side




















































6/300Ah/12 4/ /12 6/-/24
* Almost same capability of ROK K-l MBT.
Source: Internation Defense Review, Battle Tanks, Supplement to
International Defense Review 9, 1985, pp. 64-71.
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TABLE 7. NK TANK TYPES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS






Length, gun forwards (m)
Length of hull over tracks (m)
Heigth to top of cupola/sight (m)
Height to turret roof (m)
Ground clearance (cm)
Width of track
Length of track on ground (m)
Max. road speed (km/h)






Fording, w/out preparation (m)
Heater
Escape hatch in hull
USSR USSR USSR
State arsenals State arsenals State
about 1949 1955 1964
4 4 4
35,400 36,400 38,000
9.02 9. 02 9.40
6. 27 6.27 6.91
2.40 2.40 2. 28
2. 16 2. 16
43 43 43
56 56 58






0.83 0. 83 0. 83





Main armament calibre (mm) 100 100 115
Type rifled rifled smooth
bore
Length of tube (calibres) 56 56 55
Type of ammunition APHE, HVAP, APHE, HVAP, HE-Frag
HE, HEAT HE, HEAT FS, HEAT
-FS, HVA-
PFSDS
Max. rounds carried 34 43 40
Coaxial armament
Type MG MG MG
Calibre (mm) 7. 62 7. 62 7. 62
Rate of fire (rounds/min) 650 650 650
No. of rounds stowed 2,000-3,000
Anti-aircraft armament
Type MG DSchk DShk38~46
Calibre (mm) 7. 62 7. 62
Rate of fire (rounds/min) 650 650 650
No. of rounds stowed 250
75































































Engine type (No. of cylinders/
arrangement)
Fuel
Max. power output (kw/hp: rpm)
Transmission destination









390/525: 2,200 435/-: -
5/1 5/1 5/1
2-stage pla- 2-stage pla- 2-stage





6. 78: 1 6. 78: 1 6. 8=78: 1
Christie and Christie and Christie
torsion bar torsion bar and tor-
sion bar
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TANK MODEL T-54 T-55 T-62
Bump travel (mm) 200
No. of shock absorbers per side 2(1 and 5) 2(1 and 5) 2
No. of roadwheels per side 5 5 5
No. of top rollers per side
Source: Internation Defense Review, Battle Tanks, Supplement to
Internatioal Defense Review 9, 1985, pp. 80-86.
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